Edelman On Galileo Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 9):

In Science and the Modern World, Alfred North Whitehead observed that in inventing mathematical physics, Galileo removed the mind from nature.  By this figure of speech, I suppose he meant that Galileo insisted that the observer must be objective, that he must avoid the vexing disputes of Aristotelian philosophers over matters of causation. A scientist should instead make measurements according to a model with no human projection or intention built into it and then search for correlative uniformities or laws that either support or disconfirm his or her claims. 

This procedure has worked magnificently for physics and its companion sciences.  Isaac Newton stands as the triumphant figure of its first full flowering.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, as Kœstler (1979: 476-7) observed — see previous post here — Galileo removed the mind from nature through his distinction between primary qualities (e.g. the position and motion of bodies) and secondary qualities (e.g. odours and sounds), identifying only the former as the domain of scientific description, as expressed in the following excerpt from his Il Saggiatore:

To excite in us tastes, odours, and sounds I believe that nothing is required in external bodies except shapes, numbers, and slow or rapid movements. I think that if ears, tongues, and noses were removed, shapes and numbers and motions would remain, but not odours or tastes or sounds. The latter, I believe, are nothing more than names when separated from living beings.

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, this is the distinction between quantifiable semiotic construals of visual experience and all other semiotic construals of experience.

This is distinct from Edelman's distinction between 'objective' and 'projective' which, from the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, is the distinction between the projected ideas of cognitive and desiderative mental processes, that is: the distinction between thoughts and desires.

Edelman's Objective vs Projective Distinction Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 8):

We can say this in a flurry of rhymes and near rhymes: intersubjective communication in science must be objective, not projective. No wonder that magic, vitalism, and animism pervaded prescientific communication. The projection of individual wishes, beliefs, and desires was not only allowed but was a major goal to be achieved in organising societies for defence against natural threats in a sensible way.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, Edelman's distinction between 'objective' and 'projective' is the distinction between the cognitive projection of thoughts and the desiderative projection of wishes and hopes, respectively.

The interpersonal counterpart of cognitive projection — I think x — is modalisation: probability and usuality, and so Edelman's notion of objective scientific communication involves propositions (questions and statements) of probability and usuality.

The interpersonal counterpart of desiderative projection — I want x — is modulation: inclination and obligation, and so Edelman's notion of prescientific communication involves proposals (offers and commands) of inclination and obligation.

Edelman's Transorganismic Levels Of Brain Systems Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 7):

The findings of neuroscientists indicate that mental processes arise from the workings of enormously intricate brain systems at many different levels of organisation.  How many? Well we don't really know, but I would include molecular levels, cellular levels, organismic levels (the whole creature), and transorganismic levels (that is, communication of one sort or another).  Each level can be split even further, but for now I will consider only these basic divisions.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the inclusion of transorganismic levels of organisation, involving communication between organisms, additionally acknowledges not only the verbal domain of consciousness but also, implicitly, its interpersonal dimension.

The 'Mind' Of Cognitive Science Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 6-7):

But as William James pointed out, mind is a process, not a stuff.  Modern scientific study indicates that extraordinary processes can arise from matter; indeed matter itself may be regarded as arising from processes of energy exchange.  In modern science, matter has been reconceived in terms of processes; mind has not been reconceived as a special form of matter.  That mind is a special kind of process depending on special arrangements of matter is the fundamental position I will take in this book.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the 'mind' of cognitive science is a reification of the domain of sensing (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 595): mental processes that unfold through sensers and range over, or are caused by, phenomena that are construals of experience as meaning.

Brentano's Intentionality Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 5):

1. Things do not have minds
2. Normal humans have minds; some animals act as if they do.
3. Beings with minds can refer to other beings or things; things without minds do not refer to beings or other things.

This last property, called intentionality by the German philosopher Franz Brentano, served as a good indicator of the existence of a mental process.  It refers to the notion that awareness is always of something, that it always has an object.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, Brentano's intentionality, the notion that awareness is always of something, corresponds to the notion of an emanating mental process, wherein a mental process ranges over a phenomenon — a phenomenon being a construal of experience as meaning. However, Systemic Functional Linguistic theory also offers a complementary perspective, an impinging mental process, wherein a phenomenon is the cause of a mental process.