Processes Of The Mind Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 173, 175):

How can a book on the matter of the mind pay so little attention to thinking, willing, and judging, or to feeling, emotion, and dreaming? Partly, this has to do with my original intentions, which were to describe the necessary bases for consciousness and meaning in a scientific fashion. I have attempted this in the faith that further and more sufficient psychological explorations can be launched once this description is substantiated. … 

At a certain practical point, therefore, attempts to reduce psychology to neuroscience must fail. Given that the pursuit of thought as a skill depends on social and cultural interaction, convention, and logic, as well as on metaphor, purely biological methods as they presently exist are insufficient. In part, this is because thought at its highest levels is recursive and symbolic. Because we are each idiosyncratic sources of semantic interpretation, and because intersubjective communication is essential for thought (whether with a real or imaginary interlocutor), we must use and study these capacities in their own right.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, Edelman's scientific model of the mind is Galilean science, and so models the mind in terms of processes of its material-relational domain: a socially embedded, embodied brain.  The complement of this model is a model of the mind in terms of processes of its mental-verbal domain, and the contents of consciousness — meanings and wordings — that mental and verbal processes project.

Limitations In Our Thought Viewed Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 161):

That consciousness arose in the material order does not restrain intellectual trade; philosophy itself is witness to this conclusion. But it does limit us, despite our capacity to extend our senses and our powers of calculation through physical devices. Given how meaning is defined in this book, we must accept a position of qualified realism. Our description of the world is qualified by the way in which our concepts arise. And although there may be infinite freedom within a grammar, our language and our ideas of meaning go far beyond the rules of grammar. … Despite the remarkable extensions of meaning by our calculations and our experiments, we must admit that we may well be limited in our thought by the way in which we are constituted as products of evolutionary morphology.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, our description of the world is a construal of experience as the meaning of language, with these meanings reconstrued in the language of science, philosophy, mythology, etc.  It is the grammar of language that construes — and so, makes possible — the types of meanings we can make, the ideas we can think, in the fields of science, philosophy, mythology, etc. — augmented by other semiotic systems, such as the pictorial, made possible by language.

The functioning of this mental-verbal domain of construing experience as meaning — higher-order consciousness — depends on the functioning of its material-relational domain; that is, on the functioning of an evolved, species-specific, socially embedded, embodied brain.

Realism And Materialism Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 161):

By taking the position of biologically based epistemology, we are in some sense realists and also sophisticated materialists. … And by assuming that the brain is a somatic selective system, we rule out the idea of the little man or homunculus in the head. He is no more necessary to the sciences of somatic recognition than special creation or the argument from design is to evolution. If he is res cogitans, he is exorcised.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, both realism and materialism assume that meaning is transcendent of semiotic systems.  Realism assumes that reality exists independent of the mind; materialism assumes that materiality is the basis of reality.

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, meaning is a property of semiotic systems, and on this basis, reality and existence are construals of experience as meaning.  By the same token, materiality is the construal of experience as the material-relational domain of meaning.

Galilean science is concerned with a realist interpretation of the material-relation domain ('primary qualities') at the expense of the mental-verbal domain ('secondary qualities').  Cartesian philosophy justifies the material-relational domain (res extensa) by the certainty of the mental-verbal domain (res cogitans).

Exorcising the res cogitans is consistent with Galilean science, but it leaves the mental-verbal domain only accounted for in terms of the material-relational domain.

The Epistemological Lesson Of Quantum Physics Viewed Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 160):

What can we say constructively about science and about the possibility of a theory of knowledge based on biology — a biologically based epistemology? 

To construct a reasonable account, we must recognise that modern particle physics and field theory have eliminated the notion of the world as a deterministic or clockwork mechanism. This does not mean that mechanisms cannot be described or be useful (as they are to both macroscopic physics and biology). It means simply that the universe cannot be sensibly considered at all scales in such terms.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, the world that is modelled (reconstrued) by particle physics and field theory is meaning construed of experience in language.  As explained earlier on this blog, what quantum theory actually demonstrates is that the construal of experience as meaning (e.g. as an electron) is itself probabilistic, rather than a deterministic mechanism.

For example, as previously explained, wave-particle duality can be understood as 'potential-instance duality', with the wave perspective accounting for the potential — measured as probability — of construing experience as a photon, and the particle perspective accounting for actual instances — measured as statistics — of construing experience as a photon.

Similarly, field theory identifies the extent of space-time to which these varying probabilities of being instantiated apply.

Assumptions Of A Scientific View Of The Mind Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 159):

We should first state the assumptions of a scientific view [of the mind]:

There is a real world — one described by the laws of physics, which apply everywhere. (This is the physics assumption.) 

We are embedded in that world, follow its laws, and have evolved from an ancient origin. The mind arose on the basis of new evolutionary morphology. (This is the evolutionary assumption.) 

It is possible to put the mind back into nature. A science of mind based on biology is feasible. The way to avoid vicious circles and dead ends is to construct a brain theory based on selectionist principles. (This is the central argument of this book.)

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, the real world described by the laws of physics is a construal of experience as the material-relational domain of meaning.  The laws of physics are reconstruals of such meanings as the meanings of theory.

The laws of physics, as reconstruals of meaning, are not obeyed by the construals of experience that they describe, any more than a map is obeyed by the terrain it reconstrues.

The 'we' that is embedded in the material-relational domain of meaning construed of experience is the construal of experience as the mental-verbal domain of meaning.

Putting the mind back into nature would entail not only identifying the processes of its material-relational domain, an embodied brain, but also identifying the processes of the mental-verbal domain.  This distinction of domains largely corresponds to the Galilean distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and the Cartesian distinction between res extensa and res cogitans.

The Human Implications Of The Theory Of Neuronal Group Selection Viewed Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 155):

This final set of chapters asks about the implications of our new brain theory for human (and some inhuman) concerns. It pleads for an open-mindedness about the mind. It suggests that our knowledge is not incorrigible, that we are deeply embedded in the matter of the world as well as in the matter of the mind, that we are each of us unique as individuals (and importantly so), that our thinking in a culture is a critical matter for our being human and for our grasping of meaning, and that, even in disease, our minds are marvellously adaptive. … Above all, it suggests that constructing an adequate theory of the brain promises to offer bases for new harmonies, including those according to which we may place ourselves in the universe.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, knowledge is meaning construed of experience, meaning which may then be reconstrued, for example, as the meaning of scientific theories.

Such systems of meaning are evolving socio-semiotic systems whose material base, on Edelman's model, is the selection of neuronal groups in global mappings in the brains of individuals, who exchange meanings with each other in communities, by expressing such meanings in wordings.

It is the specific evolution of systems of meaning in each individual human, on this material base, that makes each individual human unique.

What is embedded in the matter of the world and the matter of the mind is a symboliser that mediates symbolic processing: whether as a senser that mediates 'interior' mental processes or as a sayer that mediates 'exterior' verbal processes.

It is the emergence of language that is the 'critical matter for our being human and for our grasping of meaning' and it is language that construes the culture of human thinking and saying.

Interestingly, from the perspective of comparative mythologist, Joseph Campbell, putting humans in harmony with Nature is a primary function of the prescientific reconstruals of experience known as mythological systems.

A Scientific Connection Between The Mental And Physical Viewed Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 153-4):

In Modes of Thought, Whitehead pointed out that philosophy is the attempt to make manifest the fundamental evidence as to the nature of things. In the same work, he remarked that scientific reasoning is completely dominated by the presupposition that mental functionings are not properly part of nature. He deplored this and hoped that a proper connection between the mental and physical could be forged within science itself.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, science since Galileo has been concerned with the outer material-relational domain of meaning (Galileo's 'primary qualities'), whereas mental functionings are those of the inner mental-verbal domain of meaning (Galileo's 'secondary qualities').  Consistent with Galilean science, Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection provides a model of the inner domain in terms of the outer domain that makes the emergence of the inner domain possible.

Models Of How The Mind Works Viewed Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 153):

Why have I rejected as a basis for mind the apparent elegance of axiomatic and syntactic systems? Axiomatic systems often seem to provide the right clue as to how the mind works, especially when taken together with physics. But they are social constructions that are the results of thought, not the basis of thought. Their roots lie in the mathematical logic of the nineteenth century. They flowered with David Hilbert, were modulated and circumscribed by Gödel, and are often conceived of in a typological or essentialist fashion. They are not a good model for the mind, for the mind must preexist to create and drive them. Consciousness is essential for their formulation and also for the Platonism that they sometimes inspire, but the facts show that consciousness arose by evolutionary, not typological, means. Darwin was right: Morphology led to mind, and on this issue Wallace, who felt that natural selection could not explain the human mind, was wrong. Plato is not even wrong; he is simply out of the question.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, all models of how the mind works are "social constructions that are the results of thought", and "the mind must preexist to create and drive them", and "consciousness is essential for their formulation".

This is because models of the mind are reconstruals (intellectual reconstructions) of the meanings of language construed of experience, and it is language that is the basis of the thinking of higher-order consciousness.  Such models are social in the sense that they are intersubjective, since the expression of their meanings as wordings enables the exchange of such meanings in a community.

Perception Of An Open-Ended Environment Viewed Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 152):

Categorisation mechanisms work through global mappings that necessarily involve our bodies and our personal history. Perception is therefore not necessarily veridical. In our behaviour we are driven by a recategorical memory under the influence of dynamic changes of value. Beliefs and concepts are individuated only by reference to an open-ended environment, the description of which cannot be specified in advance.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, perception is not necessarily veridical, and the description of an open-ended environment cannot be specified in advance, because perception involves construing experience ("an open-ended environment") as perceptual meaning, in terms of an individuated system of perceptual potential, previously established on the basis of the varying adaptive value of each of the previous instances of perception.

Objectivism Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Edelman (1992: 152):

The world with which the brain interacts is not unequivocally made up of classical categories. (It is true, however, that some "natural objects" appear to follow these categories because of the interactive features of our phenotype and the physical properties of these objects.) … Physics, which studies such a world, describes its formal correlative properties but does not contain a theory of unique categories for the partitioning of macroscopic objects. As I point out in the Postscript, objectivism fails.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, 'the world of categories' is the world of meaning construed of experience.  'Natural objects' and their physical properties are construals of experience as material order meaning (phenomena).  Physics involves reconstruing the material order meanings of language as the meanings of the language of theory.  Objectivism fails because meaning is immanent within semiotic systems, not transcendent of them.

The Construction Of An 'Imaginative Domain' Viewed Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 151-2):

For now, we can only speculate on such matters. But we do know that higher-order consciousness leads to the construction of an imaginative domain, one of feeling, emotion, thought, fantasy, self, and will. It constructs artificial objects that are mental. In culture, these acts lead to studies of stable relations among things (science), of stable relations among stable mental objects (mathematics), and of stable relations between sentences that are applicable to things and to mental objects (logic). One possible reason for the incompleteness of such domains, as shown for mathematics by Kurt Gödel, is that pattern formation in the mind always requires the higher-order bootstraps that are necessary for consciousness. Thinking occurs in terms of synthesised patterns, not logic, and for this reason, it may always exceed in its reach syntactical, or mechanical, relationships.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, it is the meaning potential of language that provides higher-order consciousness. Through the mental processes of consciousness, afforded by language, a universe of meaning (phenomena) can be perceived, felt, thought and desired — meanings which can then be reconstrued as the meanings of science and other theoretical fields. Through the verbal processes of consciousness, the wordings that realise these meanings can be exchanged between individuals in a community. Any "incompleteness" in the domain of meaning relates to the fact that it is an evolving system whose material basis is the selection of variant neuronal groups in global mappings in the brains of individuals in communities, continuously down the generations.

The Qualia Of Higher-Order Consciousness Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Edelman (1992: 151):

To remain scientific, the extended TNGS must assume that both the human subject and the human scientific observer who studies that subject experience qualia. This assumption is necessary to assure that meaningful intersubjective scientific exchange occurs. According to the theory, qualia are categorisations by higher-order consciousness of the "scenes" and "memories" provided by primary consciousness. They involve recategorical relationships that are ultimately governed by how evolutionarily selected values interact with memory. Creatures that have primary consciousness alone can neither report qualia nor reflect on them. If they experience them (and we can only infer that they do), they experience them solely in the remembered present.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, the "scenes" and "memories" provided by primary consciousness are value-weighted systems of perceptual meaning.  The qualia of higher-order consciousness are the linguistic values assigned to such perceptual tokens, through the correlation of systems of perceptual meaning with systems of linguistic meaning.

'Objects In The Physical World' Viewed Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 150-1):

"Objective" science and language both depend on the metastability or constancy of objects in the physical world. The consciousness theory assumes that physics and evolution, supplemented by the assumptions of the TNGS, are sufficient to construct a science of mind. No scientific theory of a single actual mind is possible, however, any more than a scientific account of all historical events in the world is possible.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, 'objects in the physical world' are construals of experience as perceptual meaning, which in humans, is correlated with the meaning of language, the content of higher-order consciousness.  By the same token, the meanings of the field of science are reconstruals of the meanings of language.