The Thoughts Of James Jeans Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Kœstler (1979: 542-3):

Jeans went even further [than Eddington]:

The concepts which now prove to be fundamental to our understanding of nature — a space which is finite; a space which is empty, so that one point [which appears to us unoccupied by a material body] differs from another solely in the properties of the space itself; four-dimensional, seven and more dimensional spaces; a space which for ever expands; a sequence of events which follows the laws of probability instead of the laws of causation — or, alternatively, a sequence of events which can only be fully and consistently described by going outside space and time, all these concepts seem to my mind to be structures of pure thought, incapable of realisation in any sense which would properly be described as material.

And again:

Today there is a wide measure of agreement, which on the physical side of science approaches almost to unanimity, that the stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality; the universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine.  Mind no longer appears as an accidental intruder into the realm of matter; we are beginning to suspect that we ought rather to hail it as the creator and governor of the realm of matter.

Blogger Comment:

Jeans' view is consistent with the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory that meaning is immanent, not transcendent; that meaning is within the domain of the semiotic systems, and not outside them; that meaning is a construal of experience.  Within the semiotic domain, it is also consistent with the notion of meaning as the content of consciousness, that is, as the ideas projected by mental processes.

From the perspective of SFL Theory, the concepts of theoretical physics are construals, by consciousness, of the non-semiotic domain as second-order meanings (meanings of meanings) of the material–relational domain of language.

The Thoughts Of Eddington In Systemic Functional Linguistics

Kœstler (1979: 542):

Thus Eddington wrote:

The stuff of the world is mind-stuff.  The mind-stuff is not spread in space and time; these are part of the cyclic scheme ultimately derived out of it.

Blogger Comment:

Eddington's view is consistent with the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory that categories of experience, such as space and time, are meanings construed in the social semiotic system of language, and so are the contents of consciousness.

cf also the view of William James that pure experience is the one primal stuff out of which everything in the world is composed.

The Thoughts Of Descartes Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Kœstler (1979: 535-6, 539):

The division of the world into 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities was completed by Descartes.  He further reduced primary qualities to 'extension' and 'motion', which form the 'realm of extension' — res extensa — and he lumped together everything else in the res cogitans, the realm of the mind …

Descartes carried the process one step further [than Galileo] by paring down the reality of the external world to particles whose only quality was extension in space and motion in space and time.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, all such qualities, primary and secondary, extension and motion, exist "only in the observer's consciousness" — since they are all meanings construed of experience.

The Thoughts Of Galileo Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics

Kœstler (1979: 476-7, 535, 537):

Above all, Galileo outlines a principle which became of outstanding importance in the history of thought: the distinction between primary qualities in nature such as the position, number, shape and motion of bodies, and secondary qualities such as colours, odours and tastes, which are said to exist only in the observer's consciousness.

To excite in us tastes, odours, and sounds I believe that nothing is required in external bodies except shapes, numbers, and slow or rapid movements.  I think that if ears, tongues, and noses were removed, shapes and numbers and motions would remain, but not odours or tastes or sounds.  The latter, I believe, are nothing more than names when separated from living beings. …

Though anticipated by the Greek atomists, it is for the first time in the modern age that this distinction is made in such concise terms, the first formulation of the mechanistic view of the universe. …

Galileo takes the hyperstatisation of mathematics a decisive step further by reducing all nature to 'size, figure, number, and slow or rapid motion', and by relegating into the limbo of 'subjective' or 'secondary' qualities everything that cannot be reduced to these elements — including, by implication, ethical values, and the phenomena of the mind. … 

Galileo banished the qualities that are the very essence of the sensual world — colour and sound, heat, odour, and taste — from the realm of physics to that of subjective illusion.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, all such qualities, primary and secondary, exist "only in the observer's consciousness" — since they are all meanings construed of experience.  It will be seen later in this blog that it is precisely the continued adoption of Galileo's viewpoint by scientists that makes the experimental findings of Quantum physics seem bizarre.

The Thoughts Of Russell Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [4]

Russell (1961: 788):

There remains, however, a vast field, traditionally included in philosophy, where scientific methods are inadequate. This field includes ultimate questions of value; science alone, for example, cannot prove that it is bad to enjoy the infliction of cruelty. Whatever can be known, can be known by means of science; but things which are legitimately matters of feeling lie outside its province.

Philosophy, throughout its history, has consisted of two parts inharmoniously blended: on the one hand a theory as to the nature of the world, on the other an ethical or political doctrine as to the best way of living. The failure to separate these two with sufficient clarity has been a source of much confused thinking. Philosophers, from Plato to William James, have allowed their opinions as to the constitution of the universe to be influenced by the desire for edification: knowing, as they supposed, what beliefs would make men virtuous, they have invented arguments, often very sophistical, to prove that these beliefs are true. For my part I reprobate this kind of bias, both on moral and on intellectual grounds. Morally, a philosopher who uses his professional competence for anything except a disinterested search for truth is guilty of a kind of treachery. And when he assumes, in advance of inquiry, that certain beliefs, whether true or false, are such as to promote good behaviour, he is so limiting the scope of philosophical speculation as to make philosophy trivial; the true philosopher is prepared to examine all preconceptions. When any limits are placed, consciously or unconsciously, upon the pursuit of truth, philosophy becomes paralysed by fear, and the ground is prepared for a government censorship punishing those who utter "dangerous thoughts" — in fact, the philosopher has already placed such a censorship over his own investigations.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, this division in philosophy relates to the ideational distinction between the two means of projecting ideas, cognitive and desiderative mental processes.  This, in turn, relates to the interpersonal distinction in the ideas thus projected between propositions and proposals, along with the agnate modality distinction between modalisation (probability/usuality) and modulation (obligation/inclination).

The Thoughts Of Russell On Perception Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 787):

Modern physics and physiology throw a new light upon the ancient problem of perception. If there is to be anything that can be called "perception," it must be in some degree an effect of the object perceived, and it must more or less resemble the object if it is to be a source of knowledge of the object.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, an object is a construal of experience  — the impact of the environment on the body — as meaning.  That is, the appearance of the experience as an object is within the domain of semiosis.  Accordingly, the notion of a resemblance between an object and its perception amounts to a resemblance between a perception and itself.

From the perspective of Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, filtered through the lens of Gregory Bateson, reliable perception involves different impacts on sensory receptors selecting different neuronal groups in global brain mappings.

Russell On The Distinction Of Mind And Matter Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 787):

The distinction of mind and matter came into philosophy from religion, although, for a long time, it seemed to have valid grounds. I think that both mind and matter are merely convenient ways of grouping events. Some single events, I should admit, belong only to material groups, but others belong to both kinds of groups, and are therefore at once mental and material. This doctrine effects a great simplification in our picture of the structure of the world.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the distinction of mind and matter first arose in language — as a construal of experience as meaning: the general distinction between mental and material processes.

The Thoughts Of Russell On Quantum Theory Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 786-7):

Quantum theory reinforces this conclusion, but its chief philosophical importance is that it regards physical phenomena as possibly discontinuous. It suggests that, in an atom (interpreted as above), a certain state of affairs persists for a certain time, and then suddenly is replaced by a finitely different state of affairs. Continuity of motion, which had always been assumed, appears to have been a mere prejudice. The philosophy appropriate to quantum theory, however, has not yet been adequately developed. I suspect that it will demand even more radical departures from the traditional doctrine of space and time than those demanded by the theory of relativity.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the discontinuities of physical phenomena at the quantum scale are discontinuities in the construal of experience as meaning.  Such spatiotemporal discontinuities arise because, as Bohr says, it is meaningless to ask what a particle is doing when it is not being observed.  In the intervals when no observation is being made, no construal of experience as a particle locomoting through space-time takes place.

The Thoughts Of Russell On Relativity Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 786):

What is important to the philosopher in the theory of relativity is the substitution of space-time for space and time. Common sense thinks of the physical world as composed of "things" which persist through a certain period of time and move in space. Philosophy and physics developed the notion of "thing" into that of "material substance," and thought of material substance as consisting of particles, each very small, and each persisting throughout all time. Einstein substituted events for particles; each event had to each other a relation called "interval," which could be analysed in various ways into a time element and a space-element. The choice between these various ways was arbitrary, and no one of them was theoretically preferable to any other. Given two events A and B, in different regions, it might happen that according to one convention they were simultaneous, according to another A was earlier than B, and according to yet another B was earlier than A. No physical facts correspond to these different conventions.

From all this it seems to follow that events, not particles, must be the "stuff" of physics. What has been thought of as a particle will have to be thought of as a series of events. The series of events that replaces a particle has certain important physical properties, and therefore demands our attention; but it has no more substantiality than any other series of events that we might arbitrarily single out. Thus "matter" is not part of the ultimate material of the world, but merely a convenient way of collecting events into bundles.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, experience is construed most generally as a configuration of a process and a participant that is the medium of the process, with the further possibility of other participants — an agent or beneficiary of the process — and the circumstances — spatiotemporal etc. — in which the process unfolds.  Such configurations are potentially related to each other by the logical semantic relations, forming sequences.

The Thoughts Of Russell Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [3]

Russell (1961: 785-6):

One result of the work we have been considering is to dethrone mathematics from the lofty place that it has occupied since Pythagoras and Plato, and to destroy the presumption against empiricism which has been derived from it.  Mathematical knowledge, it is true, is not obtained by induction from experience; our reason for believing that 2 and 2 are 4 is not that we have so often found, by observation, that one couple and another couple together make up a quartet.  In this sense, mathematical knowledge is still not empirical.  But it is also not a priori knowledge about the world.  It is, in fact, merely verbal knowledge.  '3' means '2 + 1', and '4' means '3 + 1'.  Hence it follows (though the proof is long) that '4' means the same as '2 + 2'.  Thus mathematical knowledge ceases to be mysterious.  It is all of the same nature as the 'great truth' that there are three feet in a yard.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, 'mathematical knowledge' is the meaning of the registers of language that realise the contextual field of mathematics.  Mathematical equations are identifying clauses.

'3'	means	'2 + 1'
Identified Token	Process: relational	Identifier Value

'4'	means	'3 + 1'
Identified Token	Process: relational	Identifier Value

'4'	means	the same as '2 + 2'
Identified Token	Process: relational	Identifier Value

The Thoughts Of Russell Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics [8]

Russell (1961: 785):

Suppose I say, 'The golden mountain does not exist', and suppose you ask 'What is it that doesn't exist?'  It would seem to me that, if I say 'It is the golden mountain,' I am attributing some sort of existence to it. … The theory of descriptions was designed to meet this and other difficulties.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, Russell's reply does not attribute existence to 'the golden mountain'.  Instead, it identifies 'the golden mountain' with that which does not exist. (The question seeks an encoding, and the answer provides it.)

what	is	it [[that doesn’t exist]]
Identifier Token	Process: relational	Identified Value

it [[that doesn’t exist]]	is	the golden mountain
Identified Value	Process: relational	Identifier Token

The Thoughts Of Russell Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 777):

… I should begin by an analysis of 'meaning' or 'significance'.  Suppose for example you are at the Zoo, and you hear a voice through a megaphone saying, 'A lion has just escaped.'  You will, in that case, act as you would if you saw the lion — that is to say, you will get away as quickly as possible.  The sentence 'a lion has escaped' means a certain occurrence, in the sense that it promotes the same behaviour as the occurrence would if you saw it.  Broadly: a sentence S 'means' an event E if it promotes behaviour which E would have promoted.  If there has in fact been no such occurrence, the sentence is false.  Just the same may be applied to a belief that is not expressed in words.  One may say: a belief is a state of an organism promoting behaviour such as a certain occurrence would promote if sensibly present; the occurrence which would promote this behaviour is the 'significance' of the belief.  This statement is unduly simplified, but it may serve to indicate the theory I am advocating.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the spoken clause 'a lion has just escaped' is a construal of experience as verbally projected wording (locution), which realises the very same construal of experience as mentally projected meaning (idea).

The Thoughts Of Russell Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 776-7):

Such illustrations suggests objectivity in truth and falsehood: what is true (or false) is a state of the organism, but it is true (or false), in general, in virtue of occurrence outside the organism.  Sometimes experimental tests are possible to determine truth and falsehood, but sometimes they are not; when they are not, the alternative nevertheless remains, and is significant.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, Russell's 'state of the organism' corresponds to the mental (or verbal) projection of a proposition, and 'occurrences outside the organism' correspond to experience construed prototypically, but not exclusively, as material processes.

The Thoughts Of Russell Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics [7]

Russell (1961: 776):

Now a belief, provided it is sufficiently simple, may exist without being expressed in words. … Suppose, for instance, in descending a staircase, you make a mistake as to when you have got to the bottom: you take a step suitable for level ground, and come down with a bump. … You would naturally say, 'I thought I was at the bottom', but in fact you were not thinking about the stairs, or you would not have made the mistake. … It was your body rather than your mind that made the mistake — at least that would be a natural way to express what happened.  But in fact the distinction between mind and body is a dubious one.  It will be better to to speak of an 'organism', leaving the division of its activities between the mind and body undetermined.  On can say, then: your organism was adjusted in a manner which would have been suitable if you had been at the bottom, but in fact it was not suitable.  This failure of adjustment constituted error, and one may say that you were entertaining a false belief.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, a belief is one type of cognitively projected idea.  In Russell's example, the belief isn't instantiated until it is projected into semiotic existence as an idea by a mental process, or as a locution by a verbal process.  Importantly, this instance is not the sort of belief that is likely to become established in the meaning potential of an individual; cf less ephemeral beliefs such as 'God exists'.

Note that Russell's term 'your organism' reinstates just the type of duality he is trying to avoid.

The Thoughts Of Russell Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics [6]

Russell (1961: 775-6):

The first question is: What sort of thing is 'true' or 'false'?  The simplest answer would be: a sentence. … Sentences are true or false as the case may be, because they are 'significant', and their significance depends upon the language used. … Sentences in different languages may have the same significance, and it is the significance, not the words, that determines whether the sentence is 'true' or 'false'.  When you assert a sentence, you express a 'belief', which may be equally well expressed in a different language.  The 'belief' whatever it may be, is what is 'true' or 'false' or 'more or less true'.  Thus we are driven to an investigation of belief.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, semantically, such sentences realise a type of proposition, statement, and are thus enactments of interpersonal meaning.  Here the concern is not with the truth of a proposition, but consensus about its validity, which is negotiated in dialogue (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 146).  Predication is not an experiential relation, but 'an interpersonal relation, enacting the form of exchange between speaker and listener' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 148).

Ideationally, propositions are the ideas that are projected by cognitive mental processes, in contradistinction to proposals, which are the ideas that are projected by desiderative mental processes.

The Thoughts Of Hegel Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [Revised]

Russell (1961: 775):

[Hegel] conceives human knowledge as an organic whole, gradually growing in every part, and not perfect in any part until the whole is perfect. … the unfolding of an eternal Idea.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, knowledge is meaning which develops ontogenetically in the individual and evolves phylogenetically in the species. Like all evolving systems, there is no endpoint, let alone 'perfection', to be attained. The system expands, which involves elaboration, extension (including replacement) and enhancement.

The Thoughts Of Dewey Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 775):

From a strictly philosophical point of view, the chief importance of Dewey's work lies in his criticism of the traditional notion of 'truth', which is embodied in the theory that he calls 'instrumentalism'.  Truth, as conceived by most professional philosophers, is static and final, perfect and eternal; … Dewey's interests are biological … he conceives thought as an evolutionary process.  The traditional view would, of course, admit that men gradually come to know more, but each piece of knowledge, when achieved, is regarded as something final.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, meaning evolves in context, and what meaning affords the species has the potential to change the contexts in which it evolves.  Like biological evolution, the evolution of meaning is potentially unending, and it involves the fitting of the system to the environment in which it functions.

The Thoughts Of Peirce Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 770-1):

The principle of pragmatism, according to James, was first enunciated by C. S. Peirce, who maintained that, in order to attain clearness in our thoughts of an object, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve.  James, in elucidation, says that the function of philosophy is to find out what difference it makes to you or me if this or that world–formula is true.  In this way, theories become instruments, not answers to enigmas.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the construal of experience as meaning has evolved in accordance with the survival value it affords the species. 

From the perspective of Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, all categorising of experience is guided by value systems in the brain — so called because the genes necessary for their expression have been selected for their adaptive value in the evolution of the species.

The Thoughts Of Russell On James Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 768):

Common sense holds that many things which occur are not 'experienced', for instance, events on the invisible side of the moon.  Berkeley and Hegel, for different reasons, both denied this, and maintained that what is not experienced is nothing.  Their arguments are now held by most philosophers to be invalid — rightly, in my opinion.  If we are to adhere to the view that the 'stuff' of the world is 'experience', we shall find it necessary to invent elaborate and implausible explanations of what we mean by such things as the invisible side of the moon.  And unless we are to infer things not experienced from things experienced, we shall have difficulty in finding grounds for belief in the existence of anything except ourselves.  James, it is true, denies this, but his reasons are not very convincing.

Blogger Comment:

Here Russell misunderstands James.  For James, experience is the "stuff" that is furnished for reflection, and such reflection includes inferring things not experienced — including events on the invisible side of the moon — from things experienced. 

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the invisible side of the moon is a construal of experience as meaning — much in keeping with James' perspective.

The Thoughts Of Russell On James Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1960: 767):

It will be seen that this doctrine [of James] abolishes the distinction between mind and matter, if regarded as a distinction between two different kinds of what James calls 'stuff'.

Blogger Comment:

James does not abolish the distinction between mind and matter; he merely claims it is derivative from experience, rather than 'primal' or 'fundamental'.  As James says, experience 'furnishes the material to our later reflection'.

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, mind and matter are construals of experience as the domains of mental and material processes; that is, of sensing on the one hand, and of doing–&–happening on the other.

The Thoughts Of William James In Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1960: 767):

[James] holds that there is 'only one primal stuff or material', out of which everything in the world is composed.  This stuff he calls 'pure experience'.  Knowing, he says, is a particular sort of relation between two portions of pure experience.  The subject–object relation is derivative: 'experience, I believe, has no such inner duplicity'.  A given undivided portion of experience can be in one context a knower, and in another something known.  He defines 'pure experience' as 'the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material for our later reflection'.

Blogger Comment:

James' notion of pure experience as 'the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material for our later reflection' is incorporated in Systemic Functional Linguistic theory in the notion that experience is construed as meaning.  This also informs Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection which assumes that the brain has to categorise an unlabelled world.

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the notion of knowing as a relation between two portions of pure experience is the construal of experience as a senser mediating a cognitive mental process that either ranges over a phenomenon, or is caused by it.  In this sense, such 'a subject–object relation' can be considered derivative, since it is a construal of experience, rather than (unconstrued) experience.

The Thoughts Of William James Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1960: 767):

Consciousness, [James] says, 'is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles.  Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumour left behind by the disappearing "soul" upon the air of philosophy'.  There is, he continues, 'no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made'.  He explains that he is not denying that our thoughts perform a function which is that of knowing, and that this function may be called 'being conscious'.  What he is denying might be put crudely as the view that consciousness is a 'thing'.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, consciousness is both the ideational construal of meaning and the interpersonal enactment of it.

Ideationally, consciousness includes mental processes of perception, cognition, desideration and emotion, in which a senser participates as medium of such processes, and a phenomenon participates as the range or agent of such processes.

Two types of mental processes, cognitive and desiderative, potentially involve symbolic processing, whereby the the content of consciousness — in this instance: meaning, the semantic system of language — is projected into semiotic existence.

By the same token, verbal processes also potentially involve symbolic processing, whereby the content of consciousness — in this instance: wording, the lexicogrammatical system of language — is projected into semiotic existence.

Interpersonally, consciousness includes acting on each other through commands, offers, questions, statements and modal assessments.

The Subject–Object Relation Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1960: 767):

James's doctrine of radical empiricism was first published in 1904, in an essay called 'Does "Consciousness" Exist?'.  The main purpose of this essay was to deny that the subject–object relation is fundamental.  It had, until then, been taken for granted by philosophers that there is a kind of occurrence called 'knowing', in which one entity, the knower or subject, is aware of another, the thing known, or the object.  The knower was regarded as a mind or soul; the object known might be a material object, an eternal essence, another mind, or, in self-consciousness, identical with the knower.  Almost everything in accepted philosophy was bound up with the dualism of subject and object.  The distinction of mind and matter, the contemplative ideal, and the traditional notion of 'truth', all need to be radically reconsidered if the distinction of subject and object is not accepted as fundamental.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the subject–object relation is a construal of experience as meaning; that is, both are in the domain of meaning, neither is in the domain outside meaning.  Within meaning, the subject–object relation is, in the first instance, a mental process involving a senser and a phenomenon.

The distinction of mind and matter is the semiotic distinction between the domain of mental (and verbal) processes and the domain of material processes.

The Thoughts Of Marx In Systemic Functional Linguistics [3]

Russell (1960: 750):

It is essential to this theory to deny the reality of 'sensation' as conceived by British empiricists.  What happens, when it is most nearly what they mean by 'sensation', would be better called 'noticing', which implies activity.  In fact — so Marx would contend — we only notice things as part of the process of acting with reference to them, and any theory which leaves out action is a misleading abstraction.

So far as I know, Marx was the first philosopher who criticised the notion of 'truth' from an activist point of view. 

Blogger Comments:

This is consistent with the Systemic Functional Linguistic theory notion of (actively) construing experience as meaning.

It is also consistent with Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, which holds that an unlabelled world is categorised by the actions of neuronal systems.

It is also consistent with the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, which holds that we cannot say anything about what things are doing when we are not actively looking at them.

The Thoughts Of Marx In Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Russell (1960: 749):

I think we may interpret Marx as meaning that the process which philosophers have called the pursuit of knowledge is not, as has been thought, one in which the object is constant while all the adaptation is on the part of the knower.  On the contrary, both subject and object, both the knower and the thing known, are in a continual process of mutual adaptation.  He calls the process 'dialectical' because it is never fully completed.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the 'pursuit of knowledge' is the evolution (phylogenesis) of ideational meanings in the registers of language realising particular fields (theories, etc.).  This evolution of ideas is fed by their development in individuals (ontogenesis), which, in turn, is fed by their instantiation in texts (logogenesis).

As such meanings evolve, they potentially change both the way experience is construed and the experiences that are construed.

The 'knower' and the 'thing known' are construals of experience as cognitive Senser and cognitive Phenomenon.

The Thoughts Of Marx In Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1960: 749):

[Marx] called himself a materialist, but not of the eighteenth century sort.  His sort, which, under Hegelian influence, he called 'dialectical', differed in an important way from traditional materialism, and was more akin to what is now called instrumentalism. The older materialism, he said, mistakenly regarded sensation as passive, and thus attributed activity primarily to the object.  In Marx's view, all sensation or perception is an interaction between subject and object; the bare object, apart from the activity of the percipient, is a mere raw material, which is transformed in the process of becoming known.  Knowledge in the old sense of passive contemplation is an unreal abstraction; the process that really takes place is one of handling things.

Blogger Comments:

Marx's 'activity' interpretation of perception, as the interaction of subject and object, has been imported into Systemic Functional Linguistic theory as the view that the impact of the environment is (actively) construed as meaning — an epistemological view that also follows from the theory of experience embodied in the grammatics.

The 'activity' interpretation of perceptual categorisation can also be seen in neuroscience, in Gerald Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection.  Here the impact of the environment on sensory detectors selects some active neuronal groups over others, differentially probabilised by the activity of inherited 'value' systems, with different impacts selecting different groups, resulting in different categorisations of perceptual experience.  Presumably the intellectual source, in this case, is the pragmatism of William James and John Dewey, rather than the dialectical materialism of Marx.

The Thoughts Of John Stuart Mill Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 744):

John Stuart Mill, in his Utilitarianism, offers an argument that is so fallacious that it is hard to understand how he could have thought it valid.  He says: Pleasure is the only thing desired; therefore pleasure is the only thing desirable.  He argues that the only things visible are things seen, the only things audible are things heard, and similarly the only things desirable are things desired.  He does not notice that a thing is 'visible' if it can be seen, but 'desirable' if it ought to be desired.  Thus 'desirable' is a word presupposing an ethical theory; we cannot infer what is desirable from what is desired.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, pleasure is one type of emotive mental process; in this case it corresponds to that which accompanies the satisfaction of a desiderative mental process.  Mill's claim can be construed as follows:

α			x β cause: result
pleasure	is	the only thing [[desired]]	therefore	pleasure	is	the only thing [[desirable]]
Token	Process	Value		Token	Process	Value

The ellipsis of the Mood element in the embedded clauses serving as Qualifiers of the nominal groups serving as Values conceals important distinctions:

Phenomenon	Process: mental: desiderative
that	is	desired
Subject	Finite	Predicator
Mood		Residue

Carrier	Process	Attribute
that	is	desirable
Subject	Finite	Complement
Mood		Residue

Here 'the only thing' (referenced by the elided 'that') shifts from being construed as the Phenomenon of a desiderative Process in the α clause, to being construed as the Carrier of the Attribute 'desirable', in the β clause.

Ideationally, 'desirable' is a quality of (impinging) desiderative projection, and the thing it is assigned to is agnate with the Phenomenon of a desiderative Process.  Interpersonally, it enacts modal assessment: modulation; that is, obligation and/or inclination.  This is the aspect that Russell picks up on in claiming that 'desirable' presupposes an ethical theory — 'macro-proposals' regarding behaviour.

The propositions of Mill's argument can be construed as follows:

the only things [[visible]]	are	things [[seen]]
the only things [[audible]]	are	things [[heard]]
the only things [[desirable]]	are	things [[desired]]
Value	Process	Token

The ellipsis of the Mood element in the embedded clauses serving as Qualifiers of the nominal groups serving as participants conceal the same important distinctions:

Phenomenon	Process: mental: perceptive
that	are	seen/heard
Subject	Finite	Predicator
Mood		Residue

Carrier	Process	Attribute
that	are	visible/audible
Subject	Finite	Complement
Mood		Residue

However, the qualities serving as Attributes, 'visible' and 'audible', unlike 'desirable', do not function interpersonally to enact modal assessment.  They are concerned with potentiality, rather than modality; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143).

This is the grammatical evidence that supports Russell's philosophical analysis of Mill's argument as fallacious.