Hume's Scepticism Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 35):

The most ruthless and skeptical of the empiricists, Hume, concluded that no knowledge could be secure given that it is all based on sense impressions.  Even scientific knowledge appeared to be shaken by his analysis of cause and effect as no more than mental correlation based on the repetition of these sense impressions. But as we will see later, sense impressions are not the issue; the biology of mind involves much, much more.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of SFL theory, all knowledge, including relations of cause, is meaning construed of experience.  Scientific knowledge is the reconstrual of (first-order) meaning as (second-order) 'meaning about meaning', the reconstrual of phenomena as metaphenomena, analogous to the reconstrual of a landscape as a map.

On the other hand, the uncertainty of meanings, as arguable propositions, is a feature of the interpersonal dimension of semiosis, and metaphors of modality suggest that all projected meaning is probabilistic.

I think	that	‘s	true
Modality: probability	Subject	Finite	Complement
Mood			Residue

The probabilistic nature of meaning-making, semogenesis, is borne out by the two-slit experiment of quantum physics which demonstrates that, at the very limits of perception, observed particle frequencies (meaning as instances) vary according to the probabilities of the system (meaning as potential).

Realist Epistemology Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics

Gribbin (1989: xv):

This concern with the ultimate nature of reality is the first of three great roots of metaphysics.  The metaphysician is concerned to know just how accurate a picture of the real world our sense impressions provide.  Our senses respond to impressions they receive from the world outside, and our brains interpret those sense impressions as indicating, perhaps, that there is a tree in the garden.  But the only things that my brain can have direct knowledge of are sense impressions; all my "knowledge" about trees is secondhand, filtered through my senses and into my brain.  So which is more real — the sense impressions or the trees?

Blogger Comments:

The epistemological assumption here is that meaning is transcendent of semiotic systems, rather than immanent within them.  It is the view that there is one true labelled reality that is filtered through senses into an interpreting brain, and that it the task of science to discover the true labels.  This is the assumption on which the notion of an eventual end of science is based.  It is an assumption rejected by the model of brain function of Gerald Edelman, and one which, as this blog argues, is falsified by the experimental findings of quantum physics.

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, all meanings are immanent within semiotic systems, and all ideational meanings are construals of experience.  In this view, the distinction between a real thing labelled 'tree' and 'knowledge' of a tree is a false distinction.  It is through mental and verbal processes that the meaning 'tree' is construed of experience.

The Thoughts Of Russell On Hume Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 676):

It is true that, like Locke, [Hume] admitted no simple idea without an antecedent impression, and no doubt he imagined an 'impression' as a state of mind directly caused by something external to the mind.  But he could not admit this as a definition of 'impression', since he questioned the notion of 'cause'.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, in the construal of experience as meaning, in terms of logico-semantic relations, the identifying relation between tokens of experience and semiotic values is not causal — cause being a subtype of enhancement — but elaborating (intensive).

However, when the direction of coding is encoding — that is, when semiotic values are encoded by reference to tokens of experience — the experiential tokens are the cause (agent) of the identifying relation.  On the other hand, when the direction of coding is decoding — that is, when experiential tokens are decoded by reference to semiotic values — there is no agency: the identifying process is self-engendered.

encoding meaning:

experience	becomes/turns into	meaning
Identifier Token	Process: relational: identifying: intensive	Identified Value
Agent		Medium

decoding experience:

experience	becomes/turns into	meaning
Identified Token	Process: relational: identifying: intensive	Identifier Value
Medium		Range

The Subjectivist Thoughts Of British Empiricists Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961):

Philosophy in the eighteenth century was dominated by the British empiricists, of whom Locke, Berkeley, and Hume may be taken as their representatives. … But while their temper was social, their theoretical philosophy led to subjectivism.  This was not a new tendency; it had existed in late antiquity, most emphatically in St Augustine; it was revived in modern times by Descartes' cogito, and reached a momentary culmination in Leibniz's windowless monads.

Blogger Comment:

The subjectivism of the British empiricists contrasts with the 'intersubjectivism' at the heart of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 2):

This perspective leads us to place less emphasis on the individual than would be typical of a cognitivist approach; unlike thinking and knowing, at least as these are traditionally conceived, meaning is a social, intersubjective process. If experience is interpreted as meaning, its construal becomes an act of collaboration, sometimes of conflict, and always of negotiation.

The Thoughts Of Russell On Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 646-7):

Hume's scepticism rests entirely upon his rejection of the principle of induction.  The principle of induction, as applied to causation, says that, if A has been found very often accompanied or followed by B, and no instance is known of A not being accompanied or followed by B, then it is probable that on the next occasion on which A is observed it will be accompanied or followed by B.  If the principle is to be adequate, a sufficient number of instances must make the probability not far short of certainty.  If this principle, or any other from which it can be deduced, is true, then the causal inferences which Hume rejects are valid, not indeed as giving certainty, but as giving sufficient probability for practical purposes.  If this principle is not true, every attempt to arrive at general scientific laws from particular observations is fallacious, and Hume's scepticism is inescapable for an empiricist.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the relation between frequency in the data and probability in the theory is one of instantiation.

Carrier	relation: ascription + elaboration	Attribute
instance	‘instantiates’	potential
frequency	‘instantiates’	probability
data	‘instantiates’	theory

That is, 'general scientific laws', as theories, are potential probabilities that are instantiated by actual frequencies in the data they account for.  In other words, theoretical certainty is proportional to frequency in the data.  This relation is implicit in Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle in Quantum Mechanics, where a distribution of (location) frequencies in the data is theorised as a wave of (location) probability.

This, in turn, reflects the interpersonal dimension of meaning, from which perspective, a theory is a modalised macro-proposition.  That is, 'general scientific laws' entail modalisation: probability and usuality, rather than modulation (obligation nor inclination).  The (material) universe does not "obey" the (semiotic) laws of physics.

The Thoughts Of Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics [11]

Russell (1961: 645):

'Carelessness and inattention alone can afford us any remedy [for sceptical doubt both with respect to reason and the senses].  For this reason I rely entirely upon them; and take it for granted, whatever may be reader's opinion at this present moment, that an hour hence he will be persuaded that there is both an external and internal world.'

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, as meaners, we construe experience as both external and internal, with

• the external as the domain of doing-&-happening, 
• the internal as the domain of sensing and saying, and 
• both the external and internal as the domain of being-&-having.

The Thoughts Of Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics [10]

Russell (1961: 644-5):

'The sceptic,' he continues (Book I, part iv, sec. ii), 'still continues to reason and believe, even though he asserts that he cannot defend his reason by reason; and by the same rule he must assent to the principle concerning the existence of a body, tho' he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity … We may well ask, what causes us to believe in the existence of a body?  But 'tis vain to ask, whether there be body or not?  That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.'

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of SFL theory, beliefs are construals of experience as meaning.  Hume's argument is that these cannot be held with certainty.  SFL theory suggests, through metaphors of modality, that, interpersonally, probability may be a feature of all projected meaning.

I think	that	‘s	true
Modality: probability	Subject	Finite	Complement
Mood			Residue

The Thoughts Of Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics [9]

Russell (1961: 640):

H[um]e repeats many times the contention that what appears to us as necessary connection among objects is really only connection among ideas of those objects: the mind is determined by custom, and ' 'tis this impression, or determination, which affords me the idea of necessity'.  The repetition of instances, which leads us to the belief that A causes B, gives nothing new in the object, but in the mind leads to an association of ideas; thus 'necessity' is something that exists in the mind, not in objects'.

Blogger Comments:

In the view of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, both objects and ideas of objects are construals of experience as meaning.  That is, they are construals within the semantics of language.  How they differ is in terms of order of experience: objects are first-order construals (phenomena), whereas ideas of objects are second-order construals (metaphenomena).  Causation or necessity can be construed at either order of experience, but in each case it "exists" as a construal of experience as meaning; they are the mental projections of sensers engaged in mental processes (or the verbal projections of sayers engaged in verbal processes).

The Thoughts Of Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics [8]

Russell (1961: 638):

The three relations that depend not only on ideas are identity, spatio-temporal relations and causation.  In the first two, the mind does not go beyond what is immediately present to the senses.  (Spatio-temporal relations, Hume holds, can be perceived, and can form parts of impressions.)  Causation alone enables us to infer some thing or occurrence from some other thing or occurrence: ' 'Tis only causation, which produces such a connexion, as to give us assurance from the existence or action of one object, that 'twas followed or preceded by any other existence or action.'

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of SFL, "what is immediately present to the senses" is experience construed as meaning.  Identity, spatio-temporal relations and causation are all meanings within the semantic system.  All are mental projections of a Senser sensing, construed from the impact of the environment on the body.  Meaning is a property of semiotic systems, not material systems.

The Thoughts Of Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics [7]

Russell (1961: 638):

It is a mistake to suppose, as many philosophers do, that the ideas of mathematics 'must be comprehended by a pure and intellectual view, of which the superior faculties of the soul are alone capable'.  The falsehood of this view is evident, says Hume, as soon as we remember that 'all our ideas are copied from our impressions'.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, the ideas of mathematics constitute the semantics (meanings) of that field: a domain.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 323):

… the semantic correlate of a contextual field is a domain. When we model the ideational semantics of a particular field, we create a domain model. … Domain models are variants of the general model. A particular domain model specifies which of the semantic systems in the overall model are activated in a particular contextual field: the ideational meanings that are “at risk”. Each field thus has its own semantic profile, which can be seen against the background of the overall semantic potential. … If we then switch our point of vantage, the overall model appears as a generalisation across the full range of such field-specific varieties.

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, our ideas are meanings of the semantic system, and these originate from the impact of the environment on the organism.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 17):

The view we are adopting is a constructivist one, familiar from European linguistics in the work of Hjelmslev and Firth. According to this view, it is the grammar itself that construes experience, that constructs for us our world of events and objects. As Hjelmslev (1943) said, reality is unknowable; the only things that are known are our construals of it — that is, meanings. Meanings do not ‘exist’ before the wordings that realise them. They are formed out of the impact between our consciousness and its environment.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 609):

… what is being construed by the brain is not the environment as such, but the impact of that environment on the organism and the ongoing material and semiotic exchange between the two.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 612):

Thus meaning arises out of the impact between the material and the conscious as the two facets of a child's ongoing experience.

The Thoughts Of Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics [6]

Russell (1961: 638):

Algebra and arithmetic are the only sciences in which we can carry on a long chain of reasoning without losing certainty.  Geometry is not so certain as algebra and arithmetic, because we cannot be sure of the truth of its axioms.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, a long chain of reasoning in algebra or arithmetic is a sequence of iterated elaborations of an initial identifying figure — an equation— that is, textually, a message and, interpersonally, an unmodalised proposition.

The Thoughts Of Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics [5]

Russell (1961: 638):

Hume begins by distinguishing seven kinds of philosophical relation: resemblance, identity, relations of time and place, proportion in quantity or number, degrees in any quality, contrariety and causation.  These, he says, may be divided into two kinds: those that depend only on the ideas, and those that can be changed without any change in the ideas.  Of the first kind are resemblance, contrariety, degrees of quality, and proportions in quantity or number.  But spatio-temporal and causal relations are of the second kind.  Only relations of the first kind give certain knowledge; our knowledge concerning the others is only probable.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, Hume's philosophical relations correspond to ideational relations:

• 'resemblance' to enhancement: comparative,
• 'identity' to relational being,
• 'relations of time and place' to enhancement: location and extent,
• 'degrees in any quality' to enhancement: manner: degree,
• 'contrariety' to extension: addition: adversative, and
• 'causation' to enhancement: cause.

On the other hand, 'certain' and 'probable' correspond to interpersonal values: high and median values of modalisation.

Hume, then, associates high values of modalisation with propositions involving relations of comparative or manner enhancement or adversative extension, and median values of modalisation with propositions involving involving relations enhancing location, extent or cause.

The Thoughts Of Hume Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics [4]

Russell (1961: 636):

There is, [Hume] says, no impression of self, and therefore no idea of self (Book I, part iv, sec. vi).  'For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.  I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.'  There may, he ironically concedes, be some philosophers who can perceive their selves; 'but setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement'.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, Hume's claim is that the Senser is 'nothing but' mental Processes projecting Phenomena.  That is, he excludes the Medium from the Process.

The Thoughts Of Russell Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics [5]

Russell (1961: 635-6):

This theory, which is a modern form of nominalism, has two defects, one logical, the other psychological.  To begin with the logical objection: 'When we have found a resemblance among several objects,' Hume says, 'we apply the same name to fit all of them.'  Every nominalist would agree.  But in fact a common name, such as 'cat', is just as unreal as the universal CAT is.  The nominalist solution to the problem of universals thus fails through being insufficiently drastic in the application of its own principles; it mistakenly applies these principles only to 'things', and not also to words.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, the word 'cat' can be used for the class (Attribute) and a member/instance (Carrier).  Both are construals of experience as meaning.

Russell treats the common name 'cat' as within language, but the universal CAT as a 'thing' outside language.  That is, he treats meaning as transcendent rather than immanent, and it this that both undermines his logical objection to Hume, and confuses him about the 'problem of universals'.

The Thoughts Of Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics [3]

Russell (1961: 635):

There is a section (Book I, part i, sec. vii) 'Of Abstract Ideas', which opens with a paragraph of emphatic agreement with Berkeley's doctrine that 'all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive significance, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them.'  He contends that, when we have an idea of a man, it has all the particularity that the impression of a man has.  'The mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of degrees of each.'  'Abstract ideas are in themselves individual, however they may become general in their representation.'

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, the relation between 'particular idea' and 'general idea', in this sense, is the attributive relation between Carrier and Attribute, which construes class membership.  One subtype of this relation is that of instantiation: the token to type relation between instance and class.

Hume's distinction between idea and impression corresponds to the distinction between mental phenomena of cognition vs perception, respectively.

The Thoughts Of Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 635):

H[um]e begins with the distinction between 'impressions' and 'ideas'.  These are two kinds of perceptions, of which impressions are those that have the more force and violence.  'By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning.'  Ideas, at least when simple, are like impressions, but fainter.  'Every simple idea has a simple impression, which resembles it; and every simple impression a correspondent idea.'  'All our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.'  Complex ideas, on the other hand, need not resemble impressions.  We can imagine a winged horse without having ever seen one, but the constituents of this idea are all derived from impressions. … Among ideas, those that retain a considerable degree of vivacity of the original impressions belong to memory, the others to imagination.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, Hume's two types of perceptions, impressions and ideas, correspond to the phenomena (things) of mental processes — those of visual perception and cognition, respectively.  Memory and imagination correspond to two types of cognitive mental process.

The Thoughts Of Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 591-2):

This difficulty [the problem of showing how we have knowledge of other things than ourself and the operations of our own mind] has troubled empiricism down to the present day.  Hume got rid of it by dropping the assumption that sensations have external causes, but even he retained this assumption whenever he forgot his own principles, which was very often.  His fundamental maxim, 'no idea without an antecedent impression', which he takes over from Locke, is only plausible so long as we think of impressions as having outside causes, which the very word 'impression' irresistibly suggests.

Blogger Comments:

In terms of Systemic Functional Linguistics, Hume's fundamental maxim can be rephrased as 'no meaning without an antecedent impact of experience'.