Chomsky's Notion Of A Language Acquisition Device Viewed Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 242-3):

All of this is by way of introducing the problem of how thought and language are connected. A clear picture must be drawn of the relation between concept systems and language. Does the mastery of language depend on the existence of a rich and embodied concept system? Or is language mastery more or less autonomous, developing by means of a language acquisition device? 

One of the most pervasive and influential approaches to these critical questions was pioneered by Chomsky. In his formal systems approach, the principal assumption is that the rules of syntax are independent of semantics. Language, in this view, is independent of the rest of cognition. I must take issue with this notion.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, thoughts are the meanings of language projected by the cognitive mental processes of consciousness.

As previously explained, Edelman's 'concept systems' are perceptual meanings organised into systems of relations. In the ontogenesis of linguistic systems, perceptual meanings are identified with concrete experiential linguistic meanings, such that the identity encodes linguistic values by reference to perceptual tokens.

On this view, a biological language acquisition device is, prototypically, a socially-embedded human being.

Theories Of Mind Reached By Conscious Introspection

Edelman (1992: 145-6):

My general conclusion, important for all theories of mind, is that given the existence of acts driven by the unconscious, conclusions reached by conscious introspection may be subject to grave error. In other words, Cartesian incorrigibility is incompatible with the facts. Descartes, an adult genius with mastery over language, did not take several things into account. The first is the developmentally determined nature of higher-order consciousness. (Recall that French babies, even gifted ones, are unlikely to assert, "Je pense, donc je suis.") The second is that his linguistically based consciousness is not self-sufficient and beyond doubt. Given that it is linguistic, it is always in dialogue with some "other," even if that interlocutor is not present. The third is that unconscious mechanisms block and intervene with what we consider to be transparent and obvious lines of thought.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Chomskyan Formal Linguistic Theory is couched in terms of the Cartesian res cogitans, and concerned with modelling knowledge of language.  The data on which knowledge of language is theorised are instances of such knowledge, namely: intuitions about language gained through introspection.

The Notion Of A Genetically Programmed Language-Acquisition Device

Edelman (1992: 126):

Speech is special and unique to Homo sapiens. Can we account for its evolutionary emergence without creating a gulf between linguistic theory and biology? Yes, provided that we account for speech in epigenetic as well as genetic terms. This means abandoning any notion of a genetically programmed language-acquisition device. It does not mean, however, that specialised heritable structures were not necessary for speech to arise. Indeed, the evidence for the existence of specialised heritable structures related to speech is not hard to find.

Blogger Comments:

The notion of a genetically programmed language-acquisition device is the sine qua non of Chomskyan Formal Linguistics, a theory couched in terms of Platonic Essentialism and the Cartesian res cogitans.

A 'Scientific' Theory Of Consciousness Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 82):

To be scientific, the theory must be based on the assumption that all cognition and all conscious experience rest solely on processes and orderings occurring in the physical world.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this criterion for 'scientific' derives from Galileo's primary qualities and Descartes' res extensa, as previously discussed on this blog.  Note that, on this model, Chomsky's Formal linguistics is not scientific, since it is concerned instead with Descartes' res cogitans.

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistics, this approach to 'cognition and all conscious experience' reconstrues the 'inner domain' of mental (and verbal) processes in terms of the 'outer domain' of material and relational processes.  That is, it provides the material basis for consciousness, but stops short of modelling consciousness itself.

Population Thinking Vs Platonic Essentialism In Linguistic Theories

Edelman (1992: 73):

It is not commonly understood that there are characteristically biological modes of thought that are not present or even required in other sciences. One of the most fundamental of these is population thinking, developed largely by Darwin. Population thinking considers variation not to be an error but, as the great evolutionist Ernst Mayr put it, to be real. Individual variance in a population is the source of diversity on which natural selection acts to produce different kinds of organisms. This contrasts starkly with Platonic essentialism, which requires a typology created from the top down; instead, population thinking states that evolution produces classes of living forms from the bottom up by gradual selective processes over eons of time.

Blogger Comments:

Linguistic theories can be distinguished according to whether they embrace population thinking or Platonic essentialism.  

Population thinking, where variation is treated as real, underlies the dimension of instantiation in Systemic Functional Linguistics.  The frequencies of features in instances of language, texts, establish the probabilities (of instantiation) of such features in the overall system of potential.  Registers of language vary in terms of instantiation probabilities of system features, or, from the complementary perspective, text types vary in terms of the frequencies of feature instantiations.  Language change occurs when the frequency of a new variant in texts significantly raises its systemic probability of being instantiated.

Platonic essentialism, where variation is treated as error, underlies the distinction between competence and performance in Chomskyan Formal Linguistics.  As Chomsky (1965) declared:

Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its (the speech community's) language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of this language in actual performance.

Population thinking accommodates evolutionary and developmental change; Platonic essentialism does not.

Autonomous Syntax Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Edelman (1992: 67-8):

As I discuss in the Postscript, however, proposals that the brain and the mind function like digital computers do not stand up to scrutiny. The idea of mental representations posited without reference to brain mechanisms and structures does not fare much better. An examination of how animals and people categorise the world, and how babies mentally develop, undercuts the idea that language can be adequately explained by syntactical analyses carried out in the absence of an adequate explanation of meaning.  The objectivist view of the world is at best incomplete and at worst downright wrong. The brain is not a computer and the world is not a piece of computer tape.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, syntax is the form that meaning takes, so the Chomskyan Formal Linguistics notion of autonomous syntax is nonsensical.  Meaning is the function that syntax performs.

The Structural Psychology Of Edward Titchener In Chomskyan Formal Linguistics

Edeman (1992: 37):

During James's time, however, excessive attempts were still being made to use introspection to reach conclusions about the mind, often with dubious results (as in the case of Edward Titchener, who regarded experimental introspection as the "sole gateway to psychology" and elaborated grand theories of sensation and feeling based on this method).

Blogger Comments:

This method was adopted by Noam Chomsky, who regarded introspection as the "sole gateway" to language and the mind, with similarly dubious results.  In Chomsky's case, this reflects the fact that his linguistics is Cartesian, and concerned with the res cogitans, and so, concerned with knowledge of language, rather than language itself (as res extensa).  Consequently, because intuitions are instances of knowledge, such introspections constitute the data to be accounted for by a theory of knowledge of language.  This appears to be unknown to most, if not virtually all, linguists working in Chomskyan Formal linguistics.

The Empiricist Thoughts Of Locke Vs Formal Linguistics

Russell (1961: 589):

Locke may be regarded as the founder of empiricism, which is the doctrine that all our knowledge (with the possible exception of logic and mathematics) is derived from experience.  Accordingly, the first book of the Essay is concerned in arguing, as against Plato, Descartes and the scholastics, that there are no innate ideas or principles.  In the second book he sets out to show, in detail, how experience gives rise to various kinds of ideas.

Blogger Comment:

The innateness hypothesis of Chomskyan Formal Linguistics holds that at least some knowledge about language exists in humans at birth.

The Thoughts Of Descartes In Formal Linguistics

Russell (1961: 550);

Descartes's indubitable facts are his own thoughts — using 'thought' in the widest possible sense.  'I think' is his ultimate premiss. … The decision, however, to regard thoughts rather than external objects as the prime empirical certainties was very important, and had a profound effect on all subsequent philosophy.

Blogger Comments:

In Chomskyan Formal Linguistics, thoughts — intuitions about language, rather than instances of language — constitute the data for a theory that models knowledge of language, rather than language itself.

The Subjectivist Thoughts Of Descartes In Formal Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 548):

'I think, therefore I am' makes mind more certain than matter, and my mind (for me) more certain than the minds of others.  There is thus, in all philosophy derived from Descartes, a tendency to subjectivism, and to regarding matter as something only knowable, if at all, by inference of what is known of the mind.  These two tendencies exist both in Continental idealism and in British empiricism — in the former triumphantly, in the latter regretfully.

Blogger Comments:

In Chomskyan Formal Linguistics, it is not language that is modelled, but an ideal speaker's knowledge of language.

The Neoplatonist Thoughts Of John The Scot In Formal Linguistics

Russell (1961: 399):

John's greatest work was called (in Greek) On the Division of Nature.  This book was what, in scholastic times, would have been called 'realist'; that is to say, it maintained, with Plato, that universals are anterior to particulars.

Blogger Comments:

In Chomskyan Formal Linguistics, Universal Grammar is anterior to Performance.  In scholastic times, Formal Linguistics would have been called 'realist'.

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, the system of potential and the textual instance are different perspectives on the same phenomenon.

The Subjectivist Thoughts Of Plotinus In Formal Linguistics

Russell (1961: 300):

On the other hand, the philosophy of Plotinus had the defect of encouraging men to look within rather than to look without: when we look within we see nous, which is divine, while when we look without we see the imperfections of the sensible world.  This kind of subjectivity was a gradual growth: it is to be found in the doctrines of Protagoras, Socrates, Plato, as well as the Stoics and Epicureans.  But at first it was only doctrinal, not temperamental; for a long time it failed to kill scientific curiosity. … Gradually, however, subjectivism invaded men's feelings as well as their doctrines.  Science was no longer cultivated …

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 Applying this to Chomskyan Formal Linguistics yields the following:

The Formal Linguistics of Chomsky had the defect of encouraging linguists to look within rather than to look without: when we look within we see the mind, which is Competence, while when we look without we see the imperfections of Performance.

The Metaphysical Thoughts Of Pythagoras, Plato and Plotinus In Formal Linguistics

Russell (1961: 293):

Mathematics, the world of ideas and all thought about what is not sensible, have, for Pythagoras, Plato, and Plotinus, something divine; they constitute the activity of nous, or at least the nearest approach to its activity that we can conceive.

Blogger Comments:

These thoughts appear in Chomskyan Formal Linguistics in the guise of knowledge of language constituting the activity of the mind.  It leads easily to an interpretation of Universal Grammar as a 'divine spark' in the human; cf. Chomsky's biologically implausible single macromutation as the evolutionary origin of (knowledge of) language.

The Thoughts Of Heraclitus And Plato In Formal Linguistics

Russell (1961: 163-4);

Socrates adds to the doctrine of Protagoras the doctrine of Heraclitus, that everything is always changing, i.e. that 'all the things we are pleased to say "are" really are in a process of becoming'.  Plato believes this to be true of objects of sense, but not of objects of real knowledge.

Blogger Comments:

 Rewording the above to connect with Formal Linguistics:

Chomsky believes this to be true of Performance — that it is really in a state of becoming — but not of Competence (real knowledge of language).

This is why Chomsky is dismissive of both historical linguistics and evolutionary biology, and also why he proposes a statistically implausible macro-mutation in a single individual as the origin of Universal Grammar.  As Linnæus, Leibnitz and Darwin put it:

Natura non facit saltus ("nature does not make jumps").

The Thoughts Of Parmenides And Plato In Formal Linguistics

Russell (1961: 163):

Most modern men take it for granted that empirical knowledge is dependent upon, or derived from, perception.  There is however in Plato and among many philosophers of certain other schools a very different doctrine, to the effect that there is nothing worthy to be called 'knowledge' to be derived from the senses, and that the only real knowledge has to do with concepts.  In this view, '2 + 2 = 4' is genuine knowledge, but such a statement as 'snow is white' is so full of ambiguity and uncertainty that it cannot find a place in the philosopher's corpus of truths.  This view is perhaps traceable to Parmenides, but in its explicit form the philosophic world owes it to Plato.

Blogger Comments:

The view that "there is nothing worthy to be called 'knowledge' to be derived from the senses, and that the only real knowledge has to do with concepts" underlies the approach of Chomskyan Formal Linguistics in modelling knowledge of language, rather than language, and in regarding instances of knowledge (intuitions about language), rather instances of language, as the data from which the theory is derived.

With regard to "most modern humans taking it for granted that empirical knowledge is dependent upon, or derived from, perception", modern Chomskyan Formal linguists, as Platonists, can claim that knowledge of language is not empirical knowledge. This is because, according to Plato's Theory of Ideas, the notion of 'empirical knowledge' is a nonsense, on the grounds that perception affords mere opinion instead of knowledge. Of course, this doesn't prevent Formal linguists from conducting experiments that will, in their view, "prove the theory correct".

The Religious Thoughts Of Plato In Formal Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 150-1):

Thought is best, [Plato's] Socrates says, when the mind is gathered into itself, and is not troubled by sounds or sights or pain or pleasure but takes leave of the body and aspires after true being; 'and in this the philosopher dishonours the body'.  From this point, Socrates goes on to the ideas or forms or essences.  There is absolute justice, absolute beauty and absolute good, but they are not visible to the eye. … All these are only to be seen by intellectual vision. …

This point of view excludes scientific observation and experiment as methods for the attainment of knowledge.  The experimenter's mind is not 'gathered into itself', and does not aim at avoiding sounds or sights.  The two kinds mental activity that can be pursued by the method that Plato recommends are mathematics and mystic insight.  This explains how these two come to be so intimately combined in Plato and the Pythagoreans.

To the empiricist, the body is what brings us in touch with the world of external reality, but to Plato it is doubly evil, as a distorting medium, causing us to see through a glass darkly, and as a source of lusts which distract us from the pursuit of knowledge and the vision of truth.

The Religious Thoughts Of Plato In Formal Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 150):

We come now to the intellectual aspect of the religion which Plato (rightly or wrongly) attributes to Socrates.  We are told that the body is a hindrance in the acquisition of knowledge, and that sight and hearing are inaccurate witnesses: true existence, if revealed to the soul at all, is revealed in thought, not sense.  Let us consider, for a moment, the implications of this doctrine.  It involves a complete rejection of empirical knowledge, including all history and geography.

Blogger Comments:

This intellectual aspect of Plato's religion can be related to Chomskyan Formal Linguistics by rewording the above as follows:

True knowledge of language, if revealed to the linguist at all, is revealed through thought, not empirical data.

The Metaphysical Thoughts Of Plato In Formal Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 137):

Here [in the last book of the Republic] Plato explains that, whenever a number of individuals have the same name, they also have a common 'idea' or 'form'.  For instance, though there are many beds, there is only one 'idea' or 'form' of a bed.  Just as reflection of a bed in a mirror is only apparent and not 'real', so the various particular beds are unreal, being only copies of the 'idea', which is the one real bed, and is made by God.  Of this one bed, made by God, there can be knowledge, but in respect of the many beds made by carpenters there can be only opinion.  The philosopher, as such, will be interested only in the one ideal bed, not in the many beds found in the sensible world. He will have a certain indifference to ordinary mundane affairs…

Blogger Comments:

In Chomskyan Formal Linguistics, the metaphysical part of Plato's theory of ideas/forms can be related to the theoretical notions of Competence and Performance.  Rewording the above yields the following characterisation of the concerns of a Chomskyan Formal linguist:

Of Competence, there can be knowledge, but in respect of Performance there can be only opinion. The linguist, as such, will be interested only in Competence, not in the many Performances found in the sensible world. He will have a certain indifference to ordinary mundane affairs.

The Metaphysical Thoughts Of Plato In Formal Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 136-7):

There is, however, something of great importance in Plato's doctrine which is not traceable to his predecessors, and that is the theory of 'ideas' or 'forms'.  This theory is partly logical, partly metaphysical. … According to the metaphysical part of the doctrine, the word 'cat' means a certain ideal cat, 'the cat', created by God, and unique.  Particular cats partake of the nature of the cat, but more or less imperfectly; it is only owing to imperfection that there can be many of them.  The cat is real; particular cats are only apparent.

Blogger Comments:

In Chomskyan Formal Linguistics, the metaphysical part of Plato's theory of ideas/forms can be related to the theoretical notions of Competence and Performance.  Rewording the above yields:

Performances partake of the nature of (ideal, unique) Competence, but more or less imperfectly. Competence is real; particular Performances are only apparent.

The Thoughts Of Plato In Formal And Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 136):

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that opinion is of the world presented to the senses, whereas knowledge is of a super-sensible eternal world; for instance, opinion is concerned with particular beautiful things, but knowledge is concerned with beauty in itself.

Blogger Comments:

This distinction, of opinion versus knowledge, can be related, in different ways, to both Chomskyan Formal Linguistics and Systemic Functional Linguistics.

Chomskyan Formal Linguistics models knowledge of language, Competence, and is not concerned with the Performance of this Competence.  From a Platonic perspective, this would only amount to mere opinion, in any case.

Systemic Functional Linguistics models the distinction between 'particular beautiful things' and 'beauty in itself' in terms of instantiation, as instance (text) and potential (system), which it regards as two perspectives on the same phenomenon.  The study of instances of the language system is the concern of text linguistics, or discourse analysis; the study of the language system itself is the concern of theoretical linguistics.

From a Platonic perspective, discourse analysis is the domain of opinion, whereas theoretical linguistics is the domain of knowledge.

From a Systemic perspective, opinions can be construed as instances of knowledge, and knowledge can be construed as 'opinion potential'.