The Thoughts Of William Of Occam In Systemic Functional Linguistics [4]

Russell (1961: 464-5):

To the question 'whether the sensitive soul and the intellective soul are really distinct in man', he answers that they are, though this is hard to prove.  One of his arguments is that we may with our appetites desire something which with our understanding we reject; therefore appetite and understanding belong to different subjects.  Another argument is that sensations are subjectively in the sensitive soul, but not subjectively in the intellective soul.  Again, the sensitive soul is extended and material, while the intellective soul is neither.

Blogger Comments:

Here the sensitive soul is aligned with appetites, and the intellective soul with understanding.  In Systemic Functional Linguistics, these correspond to the two core mental processes of sensers: desideration and cognition, the only mental processes that project ideas.  Desiderative processes project hopes and desires, whereas cognitive processes project thoughts.

The Thoughts Of William Of Occam In Systemic Functional Linguistics [3]

Russell (1961: 464-5):

The object of sense and the object of understanding are the same, but the individual is the first object of sense. …  He goes on to say that abstract knowledge always presupposes knowledge which is 'intuitive' (i.e. of perception), and this is caused by individual things. … The question involved is whether, or how far, perception is the source of knowledge.

Blogger Comments;

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, 'the object of sense' is a perceptual phenomenon (the range of a perceptual mental process), whereas 'the object of understanding' is a cognitive phenomenon (the range of a cognitive mental process).

Further, perceptual experience is construed as linguistic meaning, and it is linguistic meaning that is projected by cognitive  (and desiderative) mental processes.

The Thoughts Of William Of Occam In Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 464):

Understanding is of things, not of forms produced by the mind; these are not what is understood, but that by which things are understood.  Universals, in logic, are only terms or concepts predicable of many other terms or concepts.  Universal, genus, species are terms of second intention, and therefore cannot mean things. … A universal is merely a sign of many things.

Blogger Comments:

The contrast here is between external things and internal forms in the mind, with the latter being the means by which the former are understood.  This shares some common ground with the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistics, which contrasts outer experience with inner meaning, with the latter being the means by which the former is understood.

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics, things and universals are both meanings — construed of experience — and the relation between them is one of class membership: carrier to attribute.

The Thoughts Of William Of Occam In Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 463):

Terms which point at things are called 'terms of first intention'; terms which point at terms are called 'terms of second intention'.

Blogger Comments:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, this is the distinction between (first-order) language and (second-order) metalanguage (language about language).

The Thoughts Of William Of Occam Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 463):

A concept is a natural sign, a word is a conventional sign.  We must distinguish when we are speaking of the word as a thing, and when we are using it as having meaning.

Blogger Comments:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, the relation between meaning and wording is said to be natural, while the relation between wording and expression is conventional.  It is the expression of a word that is conventional, as opposed to natural.

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, a word is both a thing — a construal of experience — and a realisation of meaning.