The Thoughts Of Berkeley In Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 623):

George Berkeley (1685-1753) is important in philosophy through his denial of the existence of matter — a denial which he supported by a number of ingenious arguments.  He maintained that material objects only exist through being perceived.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics, the perception of a material object is the construal of experience as meaning.  That is, the impact of photons on the retina, for example, is mentally assigned a semiotic value such as 'material object'.  It is the construal of this experience as this meaning that ceases when perception ceases.

human	construes	experience	as	meaning
Assigner	Process: relational: identifying: intensive	Token		Value

The Thoughts Of Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 591-2):

This difficulty [the problem of showing how we have knowledge of other things than ourself and the operations of our own mind] has troubled empiricism down to the present day.  Hume got rid of it by dropping the assumption that sensations have external causes, but even he retained this assumption whenever he forgot his own principles, which was very often.  His fundamental maxim, 'no idea without an antecedent impression', which he takes over from Locke, is only plausible so long as we think of impressions as having outside causes, which the very word 'impression' irresistibly suggests.

Blogger Comments:

In terms of Systemic Functional Linguistics, Hume's fundamental maxim can be rephrased as 'no meaning without an antecedent impact of experience'.

The Thoughts Of Russell Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 591):

In all this, Locke assumes it is known that certain mental occurrences, which he calls sensations, have causes outside themselves, and that these causes, at least to some extent and in certain respects, resemble the sensations which are their effects.  But how, consistently with the principles of empiricism, is this to be known?  We experience the sensations, but not their causes; our experience will be exactly the same if our sensations arise spontaneously.  The belief that sensations have causes, and still more the belief that they resemble their causes, is one which, if maintained, must be maintained on grounds wholly independent of experience.

Blogger Comments:

In the view of Systemic Functional Linguistics, we experience the "causes of sensations" and construe them as meaning.  In terms of the grammar, this can be understood as the mental assignment of an identifying relational process:

we	construe	the causes of sensations	as	meaning
Assigner	Process: relational	Token		Value

The Thoughts Of Russell Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 590-1):

Empiricism and idealism alike are faced with with a problem to which, so far, philosophy has found no satisfactory solution.  This is the problem of showing how we have knowledge of other things than ourself and the operations of our own mind.  Locke considers considers this problem, but what he says is very obviously unsatisfactory.  In one place [Book IV, Chapter I] we are told: 'Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them.'  And again: 'Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas.'  From this it would seem to follow immediately that we cannot know of the existence of other people, or of the physical world, for these, if they exist, are not merely ideas in my mind.  Each one of us, accordingly, must, so far as knowledge is concerned, be shut up in himself, and cut off from all contact with the outer world.

Blogger Comments:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, the problem is solved by treating meaning as immanent rather than transcendent; that is, by regarding meaning as the property of semiotic systems like language. Visual experience, the impact of photons on the retina, is construed as meanings, such as 'other things', by the linguistic system realised materially in the neurological systems of humans.

Locke claims that all ideas derive from experience, and that perception (his 'sensation') is one source.  From this it would seem to follow immediately that Russell has misunderstood Locke.

The Thoughts Of Locke In Systemic Functional Linguistics [5]

Russell (1961: 590):

Chapter VI of Book III, 'Of the Names of Substances', is concerned to refute the scholastic doctrine of essence.  Things may have a real essence, which will consist of their physical constitution but this is in the main unknown to us, and is not the 'essence' of which scholastics speak.  Essence, as we can know it, is purely verbal; it consists merely in the definition of a general term.  To argue, for instance, as to whether the essence of body is only extension, or is extension plus solidity, is to argue about words: we may define the word 'body' either way, and no harm can result so long as we adhere to our definition.  Distinct species are not a fact of nature, but of language; they are 'distinct complex ideas with distinct names annexed to them'.  There are, it is true, differing things in nature, but the differences proceed by continuous gradations: 'the boundaries of the species, whereby men sort them, are made by men'.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics, experience is construed as meaning, and meaning is realised by wording.  Through mental processes, we project meanings (ideas); through verbal processes, we project wordings (locutions).

It is because there is difference in experience that the ability to construe difference in meaning is of survival value for members of the species.

The Thoughts Of Locke In Systemic Functional Linguistics [4]

Russell (1961: 590):

The third book of the Essay deals with words, and is concerned, in the main, to show that what metaphysicians present as knowledge about the world is purely verbal.  Chapter III, 'Of General Terms', takes up an extreme nominalist position on the subject of universals.  All things that exist are particulars, but we can frame general ideas, such as 'man', that are applicable to many particulars, and to these general ideas we give names.  Their generality consists solely in the fact that they are, or may be, applicable to a variety of particular things; in their own being, as ideas in our minds, they are just as particular as everything else that exists.

Blogger Comments:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, 'knowledge about the world' — including particular things and universals — is experience construed as meaning, which can be realised as wording.  Meanings are the projections of mental processes; wordings are the projections of verbal processes.  The relation between particulars and universals — between instance and type — is one of class membership, which is realised in the grammar as intensive attributive relational clauses.

particular		universal
Carrier	Process: relational: attributive: intensive	Attribute

The Thoughts Of Locke Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [3]

Russell (1961: 589):

Our ideas are derived from two sources, (a) sensation, and (b) perception of the operation of our own mind, which may be called 'internal sense'.  Since we can only think by means of ideas, and since all ideas come from experience, it is evident that none of our knowledge can antedate experience.  Perception, he says, is 'the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it'.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics, Locke's two sources from which ideas are derived are two of the four types of mental process: perception and cognition.  Like Locke, SFL theory groups perception with cognition, with cognition the more central class of sensing (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 143-4).

Further, Locke's thinking 'by means of ideas' is, in SFL theory, cognitive mental processing that projects ideas, where ideas — and knowledge — constitute the semantic system of language: the content of consciousness.

The Empiricist Thoughts Of Locke Vs Formal Linguistics

Russell (1961: 589):

Locke may be regarded as the founder of empiricism, which is the doctrine that all our knowledge (with the possible exception of logic and mathematics) is derived from experience.  Accordingly, the first book of the Essay is concerned in arguing, as against Plato, Descartes and the scholastics, that there are no innate ideas or principles.  In the second book he sets out to show, in detail, how experience gives rise to various kinds of ideas.

Blogger Comment:

The innateness hypothesis of Chomskyan Formal Linguistics holds that at least some knowledge about language exists in humans at birth.

The Thoughts Of Locke In Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 587):

Reason, as Locke uses the term, consists of two parts: first an inquiry as to what things we know with certainty; second, an investigation of propositions which it is wise to accept in practice, although they have only probability and not certainty in the favour.  'The grounds of probability,' he says, 'are two: conformity with our own experience, or the testimony of others' experience.'

Blogger Comments:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, certainty and probability are values of modalisation, an interpersonal system that grades propositions between positive and negative polarity.

For Locke's 'experience', read 'construals of experience as meaning' in Systemic Functional Linguistics.

The Thoughts Of Locke In The SFL Community

Russell (1961: 586-7):

A characteristic of Locke, which descended from him to the whole Liberal movement, is lack of dogmatism. … Love of truth, which Locke considers essential, is a very different thing from love of some particular doctrine which is proclaimed as the truth.  One unerring mark of love of truth, he says, is 'not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant'.  Forwardness to dictate, he says, shows failure of love of truth.

The Thoughts Of Locke In Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 585):

Not only Locke's valid opinions, but even his errors, were useful in practice.  Take, for example, his doctrine as to primary and secondary qualities.  The primary qualities are defined as those that are inseparable from the body, and are enumerated as solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.  The secondary qualities are all the rest: colours, sounds, smells, etc.  The primary qualities, he maintains, are actually in bodies; the secondary qualities, on the contrary, are only in the percipient.  Without the eye, there would be no colours; without the ears, no sounds, and so on.  For Locke's view as to secondary qualities there are good grounds — jaundice, blue spectacles, etc.  But Berkeley pointed out that the same arguments apply to primary qualities.  Ever since Berkeley, Locke's dualism on this point has been philosophically out of date.  Nevertheless, it dominated practical physics until the rise of quantum theory in our own day.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistics, both bodies and whatever qualities we ascribe to them are construals of experience as ideational meaning.

The Thoughts Of Leibniz Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [3]

Russell (1961: 573):

Leibniz based his philosophy upon two logical premisses, the law of contradiction and the law of sufficient reason.  Both depend upon the notion of an 'analytic' proposition, which is one in which the predicate is contained in the subject — for instance, 'all white men are men'.  The law of contradiction states that all analytic propositions are true.  The law of sufficient reason … states that all true propositions are analytic.  This applies even to what we should regard as empirical statements about matters of fact.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics:

encoding an analytic proposition:

an analytic proposition	is	one in which the predicate is contained in the subject
Value/Identified	Process: relational	Token/Identifier
Subject	Finite	Complement

law of contradiction: all members of the class 'analytic propositions' are members of the class 'true'

all analytic propositions	are	true
Carrier	Process: relational	Attribute
Subject	Finite	Complement

law of sufficient reason: all members of the class 'true propositions' are members of the class 'analytic'

all true propositions	are	analytic
Carrier	Process: relational	Attribute
Subject	Finite	Complement

The Thoughts Of Leibniz In The SFL Community

Russell (1961: 572):

He abstained from publishing, because he kept on finding evidence that Aristotle's doctrine of the syllogism was wrong on some points; respect for Aristotle made it impossible for him to believe this, so he mistakenly supposed that the errors must be his own.

The Thoughts Of Descartes, Spinoza & Leibniz In Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 572):

The conception of substance, which is fundamental in the philosophies of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, is derived from the logical category of subject and predicate.  Some words can be either subjects or predicates; e.g. I can say 'the sky is blue' and 'blue is a colour'.  Other words — of which proper names are the most obvious instances — can never occur as predicates, but only as subjects, or as one of the terms of a relation.  Such words are held to designate substances.  …  Every true proposition is either general, like 'all men are mortal', in which case it states that one predicate implies another, or particular, like 'Socrates is mortal', in which case the predicate is contained in the subject, and the quality denoted by the predicate is part of the notion of the substance denoted by the subject.  Whatever happen to Socrates can be asserted in a sentence in which 'Socrates' is the subject and the words describing the happening in question are the predicate.  All these predicates put together make up the 'notion' of Socrates.  All belong to him necessarily, in this sense, that a substance of which they could not truly asserted would not be Socrates, but some one else.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics, a 'substance' corresponds to a phenomenon that can carry an Attribute, but not be attributed to a Carrier.  That is, it can be a member of a class, but not a class of which there are members.  The 'logical category of subject and predicate' would appear to treat even 'happenings' as intensive attributive relations; i.e. as elaboration (logical) and class membership (experiential).

The Thoughts Of Leibniz Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 567):

The ontological argument depends upon the distinction between existence and essence. Any ordinary person or thing, it is held, on the one hand exists, and on the other hand has certain qualities, which make up his or its essence.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics, this is the distinction between two types of being: existential and attributive relational processes.

The Thoughts Of Leibniz Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 566):

In contrasting himself with Spinoza, Leibniz made much of the free will allowed in his system.  He had a 'principle of sufficient reason', according to which nothings happens without a reason; but when we are concerned with free agents, the reasons for their actions 'incline without necessitating'.  What a human being does always has a motive, but the sufficient reason of his action has no logical necessity.

Blogger Comments:

Through the lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics, 'will' is a desiderative mental process.  Through interpersonal metaphor, desiderative mental processes can stand for inclinations and obligations (modulation).

On the other hand, reason is a type of cause, which is a type of enhancing relation within expansion. The notion of 'motive' can be interpreted as either reason or a distinct type of cause, namely: purpose.

Leibniz's doctrine is thus that desiderative mental processes are caused by reasons or purposes, but that desiderative mental processes involve inclination, not obligation.