Edelman (1992: 161):
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To be clear, both realism and materialism assume that meaning is transcendent of semiotic systems. Realism assumes that reality exists independent of the mind; materialism assumes that materiality is the basis of reality.
From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, meaning is a property of semiotic systems, and on this basis, reality and existence are construals of experience as meaning. By the same token, materiality is the construal of experience as the material-relational domain of meaning.
Galilean science is concerned with a realist interpretation of the material-relation domain ('primary qualities') at the expense of the mental-verbal domain ('secondary qualities'). Cartesian philosophy justifies the material-relational domain (res extensa) by the certainty of the mental-verbal domain (res cogitans).
Exorcising the res cogitans is consistent with Galilean science, but it leaves the mental-verbal domain only accounted for in terms of the material-relational domain.
By taking the position of biologically based epistemology, we are in some sense realists and also sophisticated materialists. … And by assuming that the brain is a somatic selective system, we rule out the idea of the little man or homunculus in the head. He is no more necessary to the sciences of somatic recognition than special creation or the argument from design is to evolution. If he is res cogitans, he is exorcised.
Blogger Comments:
To be clear, both realism and materialism assume that meaning is transcendent of semiotic systems. Realism assumes that reality exists independent of the mind; materialism assumes that materiality is the basis of reality.
From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, meaning is a property of semiotic systems, and on this basis, reality and existence are construals of experience as meaning. By the same token, materiality is the construal of experience as the material-relational domain of meaning.
Galilean science is concerned with a realist interpretation of the material-relation domain ('primary qualities') at the expense of the mental-verbal domain ('secondary qualities'). Cartesian philosophy justifies the material-relational domain (res extensa) by the certainty of the mental-verbal domain (res cogitans).
Exorcising the res cogitans is consistent with Galilean science, but it leaves the mental-verbal domain only accounted for in terms of the material-relational domain.
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