Objectivism Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Edelman (1992: 230-2):

Objectivism assumes, in addition to scientific realism, that the world has a definite structure made of entities, properties, and their interrelationships. These are capable of definition according to classical criteria of categorisation that are singly necessary and jointly sufficient to define each category. The world is arranged in such a fashion that it can be completely modelled by what mathematicians and logicians would call set-theoretical models. These kinds of models, which are seen in mathematical logic, consist of symbolic entities appearing singly or in sets, together with their relationships. Symbols in these models are made meaningful (or are given semantic significance) in a unique fashion by assuming that they correspond to entities and categories in the world. Some of the categorical properties of things in the world are considered to be essential; others are seen as accidental.

Because of the singular and well-defined correspondence between set-theoretical symbols and things as defined by classical categorisation, one can, in this view, assume that logical relations between things in the world exist objectively. Thus, this system of symbols is supposed to represent reality, and mental representations must either be true or false insofar as they mirror reality correctly or incorrectly. According to objectivism, this correspondence to things in the world gives meaning to linguistic expressions; meaning is based on this "correct" or "incorrect" definition of truth and thought itself is a manipulation of symbols.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, the world structured by entities, properties, and their interrelationships is meaning construed of experience of the non-semiotic domain by the processes of consciousness.

Generally, the categories of linguistic meaning are typically not categorical: that is, they do not display determinate boundaries or fixed criteria of membership (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 547).

The models of mathematicians and logicians are (theoretical) reconstruals of meanings (data) construed of experience of the non-semiotic domain by consciousness.