The Kuhnian Notion Of A Scientific Paradigm

Davies & Gribbin (1992: 17):

The philosopher Thomas Kuhn believes that scientists adopt certain distinct paradigms that are tenaciously retained, and are abandoned only in the face of glaring absurdities. These paradigms help to shape scientific theories, and exercise a powerful influence over the methodology of science and the conclusions drawn from experiments.

Blogger Comments:

This notion of a scientific paradigm can be understood as an ontology that is construed on the basis of specific epistemological assumptions. A paradigm shift can thus be just an ontological shift or an entire epistemological shift.  

For example, the shift from the absolute space and time of Newton to the relative space-time of Einstein was an ontological shift within the epistemological assumptions of Galilean science. 

Quantum physics, on the other hand, is inconsistent with such assumptions, and requires an epistemological shift that accommodates its finding that, as John Wheeler puts it, 'no phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon'. This includes the epistemological shift from 'meaning as transcendent' to 'meaning as immanent'.

A Mere Model vs A Faithful Description — Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Davies & Gribbin (1992: 14, 15):

Generally, the more science moves away from common sense, the harder it is to decide what constitutes a mere model and what is supposed to be a faithful description of the real world. …

If history is anything to go by, nature has a nasty habit of deceiving us about what is real and what is invented by human beings. The apparent motion of the stars, reflecting the real motion of the Earth, is only one of a long list of examples in which scientists have been led astray by taking nature too much at face value.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, the distinction between a 'mere model' and a 'faithful description' is a matter of interpersonal assessment in terms of validity.  For example, the Ptolemaic astronomical model of epicycles was assessed as valid in terms of predicting planetary motion, but came to be assessed as invalid in terms of its construal of the Earth as the centre of the universe.

From this perspective, the distinction is not between 'what is real' and 'what is invented by humans' but between meanings that are assessed as valid and meanings that are assessed as invalid on the basis of scientific criteria.

The 'Real Existence' Of Virtual Particles Viewed Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

 Davies & Gribbin (1992: 14):

The situation is even worse in the new physics, where the distinction between the model and reality sometimes becomes hopelessly blurred. In quantum field theory, for instance, theorists often refer to abstract entities called 'virtual' particles. These ephemeral objects come into existence out of nothing, and almost immediately fade away again. Although a faint trace of their fleeting passage can appear in ordinary matter, the virtual particles themselves can never be directly observed. 

So to what extent can they be said really to exist? Might virtual particles be merely a convenient aid to the theorist's intuition — a simple way to describe processes that are otherwise unimaginable in terms of familiar concepts — rather than real objects? Or might they be, like epicycles, an essential part of a model that will turn out to be wrong, and which will be replaced by a model in which they have no place?

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, virtual particles are second-order meaning (scientific model), and 'a faint trace of their fleeting passage' is first-order meaning that is assessed as indirect support for the model. 

In this view, the "coming into existence out of nothing" of virtual particles is the process of instantiating quantum potential, and the actual duration of each particle is an instance of the probable duration as quantum potential.

From this perspective, the question of whether or not virtual particles "really exist" is actually a question of whether or not the model is valid according to the criteria used to assess it. As the history of science demonstrates, what is "real" continually changes as the semiotic systems that construe experience evolve.

The Distinction Between The Reality And The Model — Viewed Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Davies & Gribbin (1992: 14):

But in certain branches of physics it is not always so easy [to distinguish between the reality and the model]. The concept of energy, for example, is a familiar one today, yet it was originally introduced as a purely theoretical quantity in order to simplify the physicists' description of mechanical and thermodynamical processes. We cannot see or touch energy, yet we accept that it really exists because are so used to discussing it.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, the distinction between 'the reality' and the model is the distinction between the first-order meanings (of everyday language) and the second-order meanings that are the reconstruals of first-order meanings in scientific theories. In the case of the notion of energy, this is the distinction between a general concept such as power, and such scientific reconstruals as potential and kinetic energy. From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, energy is the ability of a process to unfold and the instantiation of that potential.

From this perspective, however, 'reality' is the meaning construed of experience, and so actually includes both first-order meanings and the second-order meanings construed of them in scientific theories. The question then is whether or not the second-order meaning (the model) is assessed as valid.

The Relationship Between Scientific Models And Reality — Viewed Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Davies & Gribbin (1992: 12, 13, 14):

The relationship between a scientific model and the real system it purports to represent raises some deep issues. … How is one to know when a scientific model is merely a computational device, and when it describes reality? … Scientific theories are supposed to be descriptions of reality; they do not constitute that reality. … However certain we are that our present picture describes how the universe actually is, we cannot rule out the possibility that some new and better way of looking at things, utterly unimaginable to us now, will be discovered in the future.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the view expressed above frames a scientific model as a representation (token) of meaning outside language (value), i.e. reality, the universe, with the model either representing the universe 'as it actually is' or not. And even though, in this view, scientific theories do not constitute that reality, physicists commonly confuse the two, with statements along the lines of 'the universe was made by the laws of physics'.

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, on the other hand, what scientific theories model is meaning construed of experience. That is, scientific theories make meaning of meaning: they are second-order meanings with respect to the first-order meanings that they model.

In this view, 'new and better ways of looking at things' emerge because scientific theories are evolving semiotic systems that adapt to the environments in which they function, as the history of science has demonstrated.