Russell (1961: 591):
In all this, Locke assumes it is known that certain mental occurrences, which he calls sensations, have causes outside themselves, and that these causes, at least to some extent and in certain respects, resemble the sensations which are their effects. But how, consistently with the principles of empiricism, is this to be known? We experience the sensations, but not their causes; our experience will be exactly the same if our sensations arise spontaneously. The belief that sensations have causes, and still more the belief that they resemble their causes, is one which, if maintained, must be maintained on grounds wholly independent of experience.
Blogger Comments:
In the view of Systemic Functional Linguistics, we experience the "causes of sensations" and construe them as meaning. In terms of the grammar, this can be understood as the mental assignment of an identifying relational process:
we
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construe
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the causes of sensations
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as
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meaning
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Assigner
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Process: relational
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Token
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Value
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