The Physical World As Governed By Mathematical Laws — Viewed Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Penrose (2004: 18-9):

Thus, according to Fig. 1.3, the entire physical world is depicted as being governed according to mathematical laws. We shall be seeing in later chapters that there is powerful (but incomplete) evidence in support of this contention. On this view, everything in the physical universe is indeed governed in completely precise detail by mathematical principles — perhaps by equations, such as those we shall be learning about in chapters to follow, or perhaps by some future mathematical notions fundamentally different from those which we would today label by the term ‘equations’. If this is right, then even our own physical actions would be entirely subject to such ultimate mathematical control, where ‘control’ might still allow for some random behaviour governed by strict probabilistic principles.

Many people feel uncomfortable with contentions of this kind, and I must confess to having some unease with it myself. Nonetheless, my personal prejudices are indeed to favour a viewpoint of this general nature, since it is hard to see how any line can be drawn to separate physical actions under mathematical control from those which might lie beyond it. In my own view, the unease that many readers may share with me on this issue partly arises from a very limited notion of what ‘mathematical control’ might entail. Part of the purpose of this book is to touch upon, and to reveal to the reader, some of the extraordinary richness, power, and beauty that can spring forth once the right mathematical notions are hit upon.

Blogger Comments:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, the physical universe is experience construed as first-order meanings (phenomena) and mathematical laws are experience construed as second-order meanings (metaphenomena). On the one hand, mathematical laws are laws in the sense of modalisation (probability), not modulation (obligation), and on the other hand, metaphenomena (e.g. maps) cannot govern or control phenomena (e.g. territories).