The Nominalist Thoughts Of Abélard Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 430):

[Abélard's] chief importance is in logic and theory of knowledge.  His philosophy is a critical analysis, largely linguistic.  As for universals, i.e. what can be predicated of many different things, he holds that we do not predicate a thing, but a word.  In this sense he is a nominalist.  But as against Roscelin he points out that a 'flatus vocis' is a thing; it is not a word as a physical occurrence that we predicate, but the word as meaning.  Here he appeals to Aristotle.  Things, he says, resemble each other, and these resemblances give rise to universals.  But the point of resemblance between two similar things is not itself a thing; this is the mistake of realism.

Blogger Comments:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, a thing is a construal of experience as meaning, which may be realised as a word.  In the first instance, it is perceptual experience that is construed as meaning. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 609):

… what is being construed by the brain is not the environment as such, but the impact of that environment on the organism and the ongoing material and semiotic exchange between the two.

In terms of 'what can be predicated of many things' — i.e. the classes (Attributes) that members (Carriers) can be ascribed to — these can be things or qualities, both of which are construals of experience as meanings.