Gribbin (1990: 241):
Blogger Comments:
From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the many–worlds interpretation mistakes potential meanings for actual universes. The probabilities of a particle going through one or the other hole are construals of experience as potential meaning. The observation of a particle going through one of the holes is a construal of experience as an instance of that potential.
There is no observational evidence in support of any of additional universes proposed by the many–worlds interpretation.
On the many–worlds interpretation, [the particle] doesn't choose [which hole to go through]. Faced with a choice at the quantum level, not only the particle itself but the entire universe splits into two versions. In one universe, the particle goes through hole A, in the other it goes through hole B. In each universe there is an observer who sees the particle go through just one hole. And forever afterward the two universes are completely separate and non-interacting — which is why there is no interference on the screen of the experiment.
… and yet, as Everett established twenty-five years ago, it is a logical, self-consistent description of quantum reality that conflicts with no experimental or observational evidence.
Blogger Comments:
From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the many–worlds interpretation mistakes potential meanings for actual universes. The probabilities of a particle going through one or the other hole are construals of experience as potential meaning. The observation of a particle going through one of the holes is a construal of experience as an instance of that potential.
There is no observational evidence in support of any of additional universes proposed by the many–worlds interpretation.
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