Davies & Gribbin (1992: 129-30):
Philosophers have long debated the thorny issue of whether the present moment is objectively real, or just a psychological invention. Those, such as Hans Riechenbach and G. J. Whitrow, who have argued for the reality of the present are known as 'A-theorists', while their opponents, among whom are some distinguished figures such as A. J. Ayer, J. J. C. Smart are called 'B-theorists'.
Blogger Comments:
On the one hand, the opposition between 'objectively real' and 'just a psychological invention' derives from the Galilean distinction between primary qualities (e.g. the position and motion of bodies) and secondary qualities (e.g. odours and sounds), with primary qualities being the only valid domain of scientific study. See, for example, the earlier posts:
On the other hand, the notion of 'objectively real' takes a 'transcendent' view of meaning, such that meaning transcends semiotic systems like language. In this view, experience is pre-categorised, independent of semiotic systems, and the task of science is to identify those categories and their relations.
However, this 'transcendent' view of meaning is invalidated by the experiments of quantum physics, which demonstrate that, in the words of John Wheeler, 'no phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon'; that is, that 'reality' is the meaning that we (intersubjectively) construe of experience. This is the 'immanent' view of meaning: that meaning is created as semiotic systems. In this view, the task of science is to make meanings of meanings, primarily of the meanings of language construed of the meanings of perceptual systems.
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