The Thoughts Of Russell Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 590-1):

Empiricism and idealism alike are faced with with a problem to which, so far, philosophy has found no satisfactory solution.  This is the problem of showing how we have knowledge of other things than ourself and the operations of our own mind.  Locke considers considers this problem, but what he says is very obviously unsatisfactory.  In one place [Book IV, Chapter I] we are told: 'Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them.'  And again: 'Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas.'  From this it would seem to follow immediately that we cannot know of the existence of other people, or of the physical world, for these, if they exist, are not merely ideas in my mind.  Each one of us, accordingly, must, so far as knowledge is concerned, be shut up in himself, and cut off from all contact with the outer world.

Blogger Comments:

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, the problem is solved by treating meaning as immanent rather than transcendent; that is, by regarding meaning as the property of semiotic systems like language. Visual experience, the impact of photons on the retina, is construed as meanings, such as 'other things', by the linguistic system realised materially in the neurological systems of humans.

Locke claims that all ideas derive from experience, and that perception (his 'sensation') is one source.  From this it would seem to follow immediately that Russell has misunderstood Locke.