The Thoughts Of Russell On James Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [2]

Russell (1961: 768):

Common sense holds that many things which occur are not 'experienced', for instance, events on the invisible side of the moon.  Berkeley and Hegel, for different reasons, both denied this, and maintained that what is not experienced is nothing.  Their arguments are now held by most philosophers to be invalid — rightly, in my opinion.  If we are to adhere to the view that the 'stuff' of the world is 'experience', we shall find it necessary to invent elaborate and implausible explanations of what we mean by such things as the invisible side of the moon.  And unless we are to infer things not experienced from things experienced, we shall have difficulty in finding grounds for belief in the existence of anything except ourselves.  James, it is true, denies this, but his reasons are not very convincing.

Blogger Comment:

Here Russell misunderstands James.  For James, experience is the "stuff" that is furnished for reflection, and such reflection includes inferring things not experienced — including events on the invisible side of the moon — from things experienced. 

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the invisible side of the moon is a construal of experience as meaning — much in keeping with James' perspective.