Wednesday 20 April 2016

The Metaphysical Thoughts Of Aristotle In Systemic Functional Linguistics [1]

Russell (1961: 175-6):
Up to a certain point, the theory of universals is quite simple.  In language, there are proper names, and there are adjectives.  The proper names apply to 'things' or 'persons', each of which is the only thing or person to which the name in question applies.  The sun, the moon, France, Napoleon, are unique; there are not a number of instances of things to which these names apply.  On the other hand, words like 'cat', 'dog', 'man' apply to many different things.  The problem of universals is concerned with the meanings of such words, and also of adjectives, such as 'white', 'hard', 'round', and so on.  He says: 'By the term "universal" I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects, by "individual" that which is not thus predicated.'
What is signified by a proper name is a 'substance', while what is signified by an adjective or class-name, such as 'human' or 'man' is called a 'universal'.  A substance is a 'this', but a universal is a 'such' — it indicates the sort of thing, not the actual particular thing.  A universal is not a substance, because it is not a 'this'. … The gist of the matter, so far, is that a universal cannot exist by itself, but only in particular things.

Blogger Comments:

In terms of linguistic form, Aristotle's 'substance versus universal' distinction is just the distinction between proper nouns, on the one hand, and common nouns and adjectives, on the other.  But in terms of Systemic Functional Linguistics, it relates to class membership; i.e. ascriptive (attributive) relational processes.  Universals correspond to the Attribute of an ascriptive relation, the class to which the Carrier is ascribed as a member, whether it be an entity (noun) or quality (adjective).

Moreover, in Systemic Functional Linguistics, Aristotle's distinction between an actual substance as a 'this' and a universal as a 'such' corresponds to one specific type of class membership, namely: instantiation; i.e. the 'token to type' relation.  A 'this' is the Carrier as actual instance, whereas a 'such' is the Attribute as potential.  This is why Aristotle's "universal cannot exist by itself, but only in particular things".

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