The Thoughts Of John Stuart Mill Through Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 744):

John Stuart Mill, in his Utilitarianism, offers an argument that is so fallacious that it is hard to understand how he could have thought it valid.  He says: Pleasure is the only thing desired; therefore pleasure is the only thing desirable.  He argues that the only things visible are things seen, the only things audible are things heard, and similarly the only things desirable are things desired.  He does not notice that a thing is 'visible' if it can be seen, but 'desirable' if it ought to be desired.  Thus 'desirable' is a word presupposing an ethical theory; we cannot infer what is desirable from what is desired.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, pleasure is one type of emotive mental process; in this case it corresponds to that which accompanies the satisfaction of a desiderative mental process.  Mill's claim can be construed as follows:

α			x β cause: result
pleasure	is	the only thing [[desired]]	therefore	pleasure	is	the only thing [[desirable]]
Token	Process	Value		Token	Process	Value

The ellipsis of the Mood element in the embedded clauses serving as Qualifiers of the nominal groups serving as Values conceals important distinctions:

Phenomenon	Process: mental: desiderative
that	is	desired
Subject	Finite	Predicator
Mood		Residue

Carrier	Process	Attribute
that	is	desirable
Subject	Finite	Complement
Mood		Residue

Here 'the only thing' (referenced by the elided 'that') shifts from being construed as the Phenomenon of a desiderative Process in the α clause, to being construed as the Carrier of the Attribute 'desirable', in the β clause.

Ideationally, 'desirable' is a quality of (impinging) desiderative projection, and the thing it is assigned to is agnate with the Phenomenon of a desiderative Process.  Interpersonally, it enacts modal assessment: modulation; that is, obligation and/or inclination.  This is the aspect that Russell picks up on in claiming that 'desirable' presupposes an ethical theory — 'macro-proposals' regarding behaviour.

The propositions of Mill's argument can be construed as follows:

the only things [[visible]]	are	things [[seen]]
the only things [[audible]]	are	things [[heard]]
the only things [[desirable]]	are	things [[desired]]
Value	Process	Token

The ellipsis of the Mood element in the embedded clauses serving as Qualifiers of the nominal groups serving as participants conceal the same important distinctions:

Phenomenon	Process: mental: perceptive
that	are	seen/heard
Subject	Finite	Predicator
Mood		Residue

Carrier	Process	Attribute
that	are	visible/audible
Subject	Finite	Complement
Mood		Residue

However, the qualities serving as Attributes, 'visible' and 'audible', unlike 'desirable', do not function interpersonally to enact modal assessment.  They are concerned with potentiality, rather than modality; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143).

This is the grammatical evidence that supports Russell's philosophical analysis of Mill's argument as fallacious.