Berengar of Tours (d. 1088) is interesting as being something of a rationalist. He maintained that reason is superior to authority…. Anselm considers reason subordinate to faith. 'I believe in order to understand,' he says; following Augustine, he holds that without belief it is impossible to understand.
John's greatest work was called (in Greek) On the Division of Nature. This book was what, in scholastic times, would have been called 'realist'; that is to say, it maintained, with Plato, that universals are anterior to particulars.
But the gist of the solution he [Augustine] suggests is that time is subjective: time is in the human mind, which expects, considers, and remembers. It follows that there can be no time without a created being, and to speak of time before the Creation is meaningless. … The theory that time is only an aspect of our thoughts is one of the most extreme forms of that subjectivism which, as we have seen, gradually increased in antiquity from the time of Protagoras and Socrates onwards.
On the other hand, the philosophy of Plotinus had the defect of encouraging men to look within rather than to look without: when we look within we see nous, which is divine, while when we look without we see the imperfections of the sensible world. This kind of subjectivity was a gradual growth: it is to be found in the doctrines of Protagoras, Socrates, Plato, as well as the Stoics and Epicureans. But at first it was only doctrinal, not temperamental; for a long time it failed to kill scientific curiosity. … Gradually, however, subjectivism invaded men's feelings as well as their doctrines. Science was no longer cultivated …
The Formal Linguistics of Chomsky had the defect of encouraging linguists to look within rather than to look without: when we look within we see the mind, which is Competence, while when we look without we see the imperfections of Performance.
Mathematics, the world of ideas and all thought about what is not sensible, have, for Pythagoras, Plato, and Plotinus, something divine; they constitute the activity of nous, or at least the nearest approach to its activity that we can conceive.
Scepticism was a lazy man's consolation, since it showed the ignorant to be as wise as the reputed man of learning.
Aristotle's most important work in logic is the doctrine of the syllogism. A syllogism is an argument consisting of three parts, a major premiss, a minor premiss, and a conclusion. Syllogisms are of a number of different kinds, each of which has a name, given by the scholastics. The most familiar is the kind called 'Barbara':
All men are mortal (Major premiss).Socrates is a man (Minor premiss).Therefore: Socrates is mortal (Conclusion).
|
All men
|
are
|
mortal
|
|
Carrier
|
Process: relational
|
Attribute: quality
|
|
Socrates
|
is
|
a man
|
|
Carrier
|
Process: relational
|
Attribute: entity
|
|
Socrates
|
is
|
mortal
|
|
Carrier
|
Process: relational
|
Attribute: quality
|
The good, we are told, is happiness, which is an activity of the soul. Aristotle says that Plato was right in dividing the soul into two parts, one rational, the other irrational. The irrational part itself he divides into the vegetative (which is found even in plants) and the appetitive (which is found in all animals). The appetitive part may be in some degree rational, when the goods that it seeks are such that reason approves of. This is essential to the account of virtue, for reason alone, in Aristotle, is purely contemplative, and does not, without the help of the appetite, lead to any practical activity.
There are two kinds of virtues, intellectual and moral, corresponding to the two parts of the soul. Intellectual virtues result from teaching, moral virtues from habit.
There is in the soul one element that is rational, and one that is irrational. The irrational part is two-fold: the vegetative, which is found in everything living, even in plants, and the appetitive, which exists in all animals. The life of the rational soul consists in contemplation, which is the complete happiness of man though not fully attainable.
The form of a thing, we are told, is its essence and primary substance. Forms are substantial, although universals are not. … Not everything has matter; there are eternal things, and these have no matter, except those of them that are movable in space. Things increase in actuality by acquiring form; matter without form is only a potentiality. …
The doctrine of matter and form in Aristotle is connected with the distinction of potentiality and actuality. Bare matter is conceived as a potentiality of form.
Up to a certain point, the theory of universals is quite simple. In language, there are proper names, and there are adjectives. The proper names apply to 'things' or 'persons', each of which is the only thing or person to which the name in question applies. The sun, the moon, France, Napoleon, are unique; there are not a number of instances of things to which these names apply. On the other hand, words like 'cat', 'dog', 'man' apply to many different things. The problem of universals is concerned with the meanings of such words, and also of adjectives, such as 'white', 'hard', 'round', and so on. He says: 'By the term "universal" I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects, by "individual" that which is not thus predicated.'
What is signified by a proper name is a 'substance', while what is signified by an adjective or class-name, such as 'human' or 'man' is called a 'universal'. A substance is a 'this', but a universal is a 'such' — it indicates the sort of thing, not the actual particular thing. A universal is not a substance, because it is not a 'this'. … The gist of the matter, so far, is that a universal cannot exist by itself, but only in particular things.
As for the argument that that, if each man is the measure of all things, one man is as wise as another, Socrates suggests, on behalf of Protagoras, a very interesting answer, namely that, while one judgement cannot be truer than another, it can be better, in the sense of having better consequences. This suggests pragmatism.
Returning to perception, it is regarded as due to an interaction between the object and the sense-organ, both of which, according to the doctrine of Heraclitus, are always changing, and both of which, in changing, change the percept. Socrates remarks that when he is well he finds wine sweet, but when ill, sour. Here it is a change in the percipient that causes the change in the percept.
… what is being construed by the brain is not the environment as such, but the impact of that environment on the organism and the ongoing material and semiotic exchange between the two.
Socrates adds to the doctrine of Protagoras the doctrine of Heraclitus, that everything is always changing, i.e. that 'all the things we are pleased to say "are" really are in a process of becoming'. Plato believes this to be true of objects of sense, but not of objects of real knowledge.
Chomsky believes this to be true of Performance — that it is really in a state of becoming — but not of Competence (real knowledge of language).
Natura non facit saltus ("nature does not make jumps").
Most modern men take it for granted that empirical knowledge is dependent upon, or derived from, perception. There is however in Plato and among many philosophers of certain other schools a very different doctrine, to the effect that there is nothing worthy to be called 'knowledge' to be derived from the senses, and that the only real knowledge has to do with concepts. In this view, '2 + 2 = 4' is genuine knowledge, but such a statement as 'snow is white' is so full of ambiguity and uncertainty that it cannot find a place in the philosopher's corpus of truths. This view is perhaps traceable to Parmenides, but in its explicit form the philosophic world owes it to Plato.
To the empiricist, the body is what brings us in touch with the world of external reality …
… what is being construed by the brain is not the environment as such, but the impact of that environment on the organism and the ongoing material and semiotic exchange between the two.
Thought is best, [Plato's] Socrates says, when the mind is gathered into itself, and is not troubled by sounds or sights or pain or pleasure but takes leave of the body and aspires after true being; 'and in this the philosopher dishonours the body'. From this point, Socrates goes on to the ideas or forms or essences. There is absolute justice, absolute beauty and absolute good, but they are not visible to the eye. … All these are only to be seen by intellectual vision. …
This point of view excludes scientific observation and experiment as methods for the attainment of knowledge. The experimenter's mind is not 'gathered into itself', and does not aim at avoiding sounds or sights. The two kinds mental activity that can be pursued by the method that Plato recommends are mathematics and mystic insight. This explains how these two come to be so intimately combined in Plato and the Pythagoreans.
To the empiricist, the body is what brings us in touch with the world of external reality, but to Plato it is doubly evil, as a distorting medium, causing us to see through a glass darkly, and as a source of lusts which distract us from the pursuit of knowledge and the vision of truth.
We come now to the intellectual aspect of the religion which Plato (rightly or wrongly) attributes to Socrates. We are told that the body is a hindrance in the acquisition of knowledge, and that sight and hearing are inaccurate witnesses: true existence, if revealed to the soul at all, is revealed in thought, not sense. Let us consider, for a moment, the implications of this doctrine. It involves a complete rejection of empirical knowledge, including all history and geography.
True knowledge of language, if revealed to the linguist at all, is revealed through thought, not empirical data.
The distinction between mind and matter, which has become a commonplace in philosophy and science and popular thought, has a religious origin, and began as the distinction of soul and body.
Here [in the last book of the Republic] Plato explains that, whenever a number of individuals have the same name, they also have a common 'idea' or 'form'. For instance, though there are many beds, there is only one 'idea' or 'form' of a bed. Just as reflection of a bed in a mirror is only apparent and not 'real', so the various particular beds are unreal, being only copies of the 'idea', which is the one real bed, and is made by God. Of this one bed, made by God, there can be knowledge, but in respect of the many beds made by carpenters there can be only opinion. The philosopher, as such, will be interested only in the one ideal bed, not in the many beds found in the sensible world. He will have a certain indifference to ordinary mundane affairs…
Of Competence, there can be knowledge, but in respect of Performance there can be only opinion. The linguist, as such, will be interested only in Competence, not in the many Performances found in the sensible world. He will have a certain indifference to ordinary mundane affairs.
There is, however, something of great importance in Plato's doctrine which is not traceable to his predecessors, and that is the theory of 'ideas' or 'forms'. This theory is partly logical, partly metaphysical. … According to the metaphysical part of the doctrine, the word 'cat' means a certain ideal cat, 'the cat', created by God, and unique. Particular cats partake of the nature of the cat, but more or less imperfectly; it is only owing to imperfection that there can be many of them. The cat is real; particular cats are only apparent.
Performances partake of the nature of (ideal, unique) Competence, but more or less imperfectly. Competence is real; particular Performances are only apparent.
There is, however, something of great importance in Plato's doctrine which is not traceable to his predecessors, and that is the theory of 'ideas' or 'forms'. This theory is partly logical, partly metaphysical. The logical part has to do with the meaning of general words. There are many individual animals of whom we can truly say 'this is a cat'. What do we mean by the word 'cat'? Obviously something different from each particular cat. An animal is a cat, it seems, because it participates in a general nature common to all cats. Language cannot get on without general words such as 'cat', and such words are evidently not meaningless. But if the word 'cat' means anything, it means something which is not this or that cat, but some kind of universal* cattiness. This is not born when a particular cat is born, and does not die when it dies. In fact, it has no position in space and time; it is 'eternal'. This is the logical part of the doctrine.
Thus we arrive at the conclusion that opinion is of the world presented to the senses, whereas knowledge is of a super-sensible eternal world; for instance, opinion is concerned with particular beautiful things, but knowledge is concerned with beauty in itself.
Plato's philosophy rests on the distinction between reality and appearance, which was first set forth by Parmenides;
Linguistic competence is the system of linguistic knowledge possessed by native speakers of a language. It is distinguished from linguistic performance, which is the way a language system is used in communication. Noam Chomsky introduced this concept in his elaboration of generative grammar, where it has been widely adopted and competence is the only level of language that is studied.
From Parmenides he [Plato] derived the belief that reality is eternal and timeless, and that, on logical grounds, all change must be illusory. From Heraclitus he derived the negative doctrine that there is nothing permanent in the sensible world. This, combined with the doctrine of Parmenides, led to the conclusion that knowledge is not to be derived from the senses, but is only to be achieved by the intellect. This, in turn, fitted in well with Pythagoreanism.
knowledge of language is not to be derived from perceiving texts (instances of language), but is only to be achieved by the considering intuitions about language (instances of knowledge).
One of three founders of pragmatism, F.C.S. Schiller was in the habit of calling himself a disciple of Protagoras. This was, I think, because Plato, in the Theætetus, suggests, as an interpretation of Protagoras, that one opinion can be better than another, though it cannot be truer. For example, when a man has jaundice everything looks yellow. There is no sense in saying that things are really not yellow, but the colour they look to a man in health; we can say, however, that, since health is better than sickness, the opinion of a man in health is better than that of a man who has jaundice. This point of view, obviously, is akin to pragmatism.
The disbelief in objective truth makes the majority, for practical purposes, the arbiters as to what to believe.
Most sciences, at their inception, have been connected with some form of false belief, which gave them a fictitious value. Astronomy was connected with astrology, chemistry with alchemy. Mathematics was associated with a more refined type of error. Mathematical knowledge appeared to be certain, exact, and applicable to the real world; moreover it was obtained by mere thinking, without the need for observation. Consequently, it was thought to supply an ideal, from which every-day empirical knowledge fell short. It was supposed, on the basis of mathematics, that thought is superior to sense, intuition to observation. If the world of sense does not fit mathematics, so much the worse for the world of sense. In various ways, methods of approaching nearer to the mathematician's ideal were sought, and the resulting suggestions were the source of much that was mistaken in metaphysics and the theory of knowledge. This form of philosophy begins with Pythagoras.
Throughout this long development, from 600 BC to the present day, philosophers have been divided into those who wished to tighten social bonds and those who wished to relax them. With this difference, others have been associated. The disciplinarians have advocated some system of dogma, either old or new, and have therefore been compelled to be, in greater or lesser degree, hostile to science, since their dogmas could not be proved empirically. They have almost invariably taught that happiness is not the good, but that ‘nobility’ or ‘heroism’ is to be preferred. They have had a sympathy with irrational parts of human nature, since they have felt reason to be inimical to social cohesion. The libertarians, on the other hand, with the exception of the extreme anarchists, have tended to be scientific, utilitarian, rationalistic, hostile to violent passion, and enemies of all the more profound forms of religion. This conflict existed in Greece before the rise of we recognise as philosophy, and is already quite explicit in the earliest Greek thought. In changing forms, it has persisted down to the present day, and no doubt will persist for many ages to come.
The Anabaptists repudiated all law, since they held that a good man will be guided at every moment by the Holy Spirit, who cannot be bound by formulas. From this premiss they arrive at communism and sexual promiscuity; they were therefore exterminated after a heroic resistance. But their doctrine, in softened forms, spread to Holland, England and America; historically it is the source of Quakerism.
Modern philosophy begins with Descartes, whose fundamental certainty is in the existence of himself and his thoughts, from which the external world is to be inferred. This was only the first stage in a development, through Berkeley and Kant, to Fichte, for whom everything is only an emanation of the ego. This was insanity, and, from this extreme, philosophy has been attempting, ever since, to escape into the world of everyday common sense. With subjectivism in philosophy, anarchism in politics goes hand in hand.
