Friday 15 July 2016

The Logical Thoughts Of Russell On Kant Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 679):
[For Kant] a 'synthetic' proposition is one that is not analytic. All the propositions that we know only through experience are synthetic. … But Kant, unlike Leibniz and all other previous philosophers, will not admit the converse, that all synthetic propositions are only known through experience.
Blogger Comment:

In presenting the following pair of propositions as converse:
  1. all the propositions that we know only through experience are synthetic
  2. all synthetic propositions are only known through experience
Russell is construing them, from the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, as two attributive clauses:

1.
All the propositions that we know only through experience
are
synthetic
Carrier
Process
Attribute
Subject
Finite
Complement
Mood
Residue

The above construes all the propositions that we know only through experience as members of the class synthetic.

2.
All synthetic propositions
are
only
known through experience
Carrier
Process

Attribute
Subject
Finite
Adjunct: counterexpectancy: limiting
Complement
Mood
Residue

The above construes all synthetic propositions as members of the class (only) known through experience.


However, this second construal varies slightly from the grammar of the clause, as worded:

2a.
All synthetic propositions
are
only
known
through experience
Phenomenon
Process:

mental
Manner: means
Subject
Finite
Adjunct: counterexpectancy: limiting
Predicator
Adjunct
Mood
Residue

The above construes all synthetic propositions as Phenomena of one means of cognitive mental processing.

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