The Logical Thoughts Of Russell On Kant Vs Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 679):

[For Kant] a 'synthetic' proposition is one that is not analytic. All the propositions that we know only through experience are synthetic. … But Kant, unlike Leibniz and all other previous philosophers, will not admit the converse, that all synthetic propositions are only known through experience.

Blogger Comment:

In presenting the following pair of propositions as converse:

1. all the propositions that we know only through experience are synthetic
2. all synthetic propositions are only known through experience

Russell is construing them, from the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, as two attributive clauses:

1.

All the propositions that we know only through experience	are	synthetic
Carrier	Process	Attribute
Subject	Finite	Complement
Mood		Residue

The above construes all the propositions that we know only through experience as members of the class synthetic.

2.

All synthetic propositions	are	only	known through experience
Carrier	Process		Attribute
Subject	Finite	Adjunct: counterexpectancy: limiting	Complement
Mood			Residue

The above construes all synthetic propositions as members of the class (only) known through experience.

However, this second construal varies slightly from the grammar of the clause, as worded:

2a.

All synthetic propositions	are	only	known	through experience
Phenomenon	Process:		mental	Manner: means
Subject	Finite	Adjunct: counterexpectancy: limiting	Predicator	Adjunct
Mood			Residue

The above construes all synthetic propositions as Phenomena of one means of cognitive mental processing.