The Thoughts Of Russell On Hume In Systemic Functional Linguistics

Russell (1961: 646-7):

Hume's scepticism rests entirely upon his rejection of the principle of induction.  The principle of induction, as applied to causation, says that, if A has been found very often accompanied or followed by B, and no instance is known of A not being accompanied or followed by B, then it is probable that on the next occasion on which A is observed it will be accompanied or followed by B.  If the principle is to be adequate, a sufficient number of instances must make the probability not far short of certainty.  If this principle, or any other from which it can be deduced, is true, then the causal inferences which Hume rejects are valid, not indeed as giving certainty, but as giving sufficient probability for practical purposes.  If this principle is not true, every attempt to arrive at general scientific laws from particular observations is fallacious, and Hume's scepticism is inescapable for an empiricist.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, the relation between frequency in the data and probability in the theory is one of instantiation.

Carrier	relation: ascription + elaboration	Attribute
instance	‘instantiates’	potential
frequency	‘instantiates’	probability
data	‘instantiates’	theory

That is, 'general scientific laws', as theories, are potential probabilities that are instantiated by actual frequencies in the data they account for.  In other words, theoretical certainty is proportional to frequency in the data.  This relation is implicit in Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle in Quantum Mechanics, where a distribution of (location) frequencies in the data is theorised as a wave of (location) probability.

This, in turn, reflects the interpersonal dimension of meaning, from which perspective, a theory is a modalised macro-proposition.  That is, 'general scientific laws' entail modalisation: probability and usuality, rather than modulation (obligation nor inclination).  The (material) universe does not "obey" the (semiotic) laws of physics.