Kant had maintained that a study of the moral law can take us behind phenomena, and give us knowledge which sense-perception cannot give; he also maintained that moral law is essentially concerned with the will. The difference between a good man and a bad man is, for Kant, a difference in the world of things–in–themselves, and is also a difference as to volitions. It follows that, for Kant, volitions must belong to the real world, not to the world of phenomena. The phenomenon corresponding to a volition is a bodily movement; that is why, according to Schopenhauer, the body is the appearance of which will is the reality.
Blogger Comment:
From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, Schopenhauer ascribes the semiotic construal that is desiderative consciousness to the domain outside semiotic construals.
volitions
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must belong to
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the real world (things–in–themselves/noumena)
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Carrier: possessed
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Process: relational: possession
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Attribute: possessor
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a senser desiring
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must belong to
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the experience that is construed as meaning
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Moreover, Schopenhauer regards desiderative mental processes as 'reality' (noumena) and their corresponding bodily material processes as mere 'appearance' (phenomena).
noumenon = reality
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phenomenon= appearance
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volition
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bodily movement
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a senser desiring
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an actor doing
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