The Thoughts Of Kant Through Systemic Functional Linguistics [10]

Russell (1961: 685):

Kant, like Berkeley and Hume, though in not quite the same way, goes further [than Locke], and makes the primary qualities also subjective.  Kant does not at most times question that our sensations have causes, which he calls 'things-in-themselves' or 'noumena'.  What appears to us in perception, which he calls a 'phenomenon', consists of two parts: that due to the object, which he calls the 'sensation', and that due to our subjective apparatus, which, he says, causes the manifold to be ordered in certain relations.  This latter part he calls the form of the phenomenon.  This part is not itself sensation, and therefore not dependent upon the accident of environment; it is always the same, since we carry it about with us, and it is a priori in the sense that it is not dependent on experience.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory, all qualities, primary and secondary, are intersubjective construals of experience as meaning.

Kant's 'noumena' might be compared with the experiences that are mentally construed as meaning, as phenomena, with the provisos that these are not 'things' or 'objects' unless they are construed as such, and that it is the impact on the body that is construed as meaning, as mental phenomena.

Kant's 'sensation' might be compared with the phenomenon of a perceptual mental process, as instance, whereas Kant's 'form' of the phenomenon might be compared with the phenomenon of a cognitive mental process, as systemic potential.

	phenomenon of cognition	phenomenon of perception
system	‘form’
instance		‘sensation’